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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of welfare benefits on the east-west internal European 
migration. Based on the existing theoretical discussions, we present a migration model where 
welfare benefits stand amongst the key factors. Combing this with the compiled data from 
Eurostat, OECD and World Bank WDI, we conduct an empirical analysis afterwards on the 
migration flow from 12 “east” countries to 15 “west” countries during the period of 1992-
2006. The results tend to indicate that generally speaking, the migration flow in the context 
of east-west internal European migration is determined by the regional differences in income 
or wages and in employment opportunity, by migration network, and by costs and risks 
rendered by language and distance. As to the effect of welfare benefits, the existence of 
welfare magnets seems to be supported to a certain extent, yet there finds certain implication 
that the impact does not stand robust.  
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1. Introduction 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Since the dissolution of the “Communist Community” in the central and eastern region of 
Europe at the end of 1980s, the internal European migration therefrom began to accelerate.  
The guest worker scheme, the European Agreement since 1993, as well as the bilateral 
agreement between Central and Eastern European countries and individual Western 
European countries further instigated the phenomenon. In 1993, the influx of immigrants 
into Germany, France, Italy, UK and Greece from East Europe totaled 0.6 million (Bruecker 
et al., 2002). And the year 1997 witnessed an official record of 0,95 million people from the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) living in the European Union (Alecke et 
al., 2001). Given the incompleteness of the official data and considering the fact that 
European Union‟s measure of immigration is based on nationality and hence normally 
excludes the naturalized group, the flow of people from CEEC into EU should be much more 
“impressive” than what is mathematically described above. 
 
Such an “impressive” internal European migration has long before aroused the interests of 
scholars and researchers in this field. Some of them touched upon more peripheral issues 
such as the assimilation and integration of migrants. Some of them examined the impact of 
migration, both on the receiving countries and on the sending countries. And relatively more 
of them probed into the causes of this internal European migration, through exploring the 
mechanism of migration decision.  
 
Drawing upon the relatively well-developed thesaurus of migration theories which can be 
traced back to Smith (1776) and Ravenstein (1889), scholars distinguished their researches 
through different levels of analysis, micro perspective versus macro perspective, through 
different proposed locus of migratory action, individual, household versus more macro one 
such as social structure and economic transformation, and through different emphases, on 
economic factors, social conditions versus other specific considerations. However, a close 
look at the empirical studies in particular would yield a common pool of explanatory factors. 
Generally speaking, therein find GDP, unemployment rate, wage, income distribution, and 
etc. The philosophy behind is that the difference between the receiving countries and the 
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sending countries in those fields mentioned above constitutes the magnets that foster internal 
European migration. Notwithstanding, another field which in general also boasts difference, 
is surprisingly often neglected, that is, the welfare system. And the very aim of this paper is 
to address this small black hole through investigating and testing the effect of welfare 
systems in the older EU member states on the migration from the Central and Eastern 
European countries.     
 
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review. 
Chapter 3 formulates a migration model. The collected data is described and summarized in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 gives out model specifications and focuses on interpreting regression 
results from Stata. And a brief conclusion is given in Chapter 6.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical approaches regarding the causes of 
international migration 
 
The efforts to account for international migration prevail across different disciplines. 
Hoffmann-Nowotny (1981), from the perspective of sociology, proposes the tension 
approach, stating that migration is “a means of a tension management policy” to reduce the 
structural or anomic tensions arising respectively from the divergence of power and prestige 
and from the external position of a power deficit system and the imbalance in internal status 
quo (Gorter et al., 1998). Another group of scholars, based on the work of Wallerstein 
(1974), discuss the international migration from the combined perspective of sociology and 
political science and devise the world systems theory, which regards migration as the natural 
offspring of “disruptions and dislocations that inevitably occur in the process of capitalist 
development” (Massey et al.,  1993). Studying international migration theories regardless of 
the disciplinary boundaries may help to capture the complex and multifaceted nature of 
international migration. However, considering the length of this paper, we will limit 
ourselves here to a concise review of those that are relatively more closely related to the 
discipline of economics, namely, neoclassical theory, human capital theory, the new 
economics of migration and migration system theory. For a more detailed review of 
international migration theories across disciplines, please refer to Nijkamp and Spiess 
(1994), Gorter et al. (1998), Bauer and Zimmermann (1998) and Massey et al. (1993). 
2.1.1 Neoclassical theory of migration 
 
Probably the oldest theory of international migration, the neoclassical migration theory can 
be dated back to Smith (1776) and Ravenstein (1889). It poses that migration decision is 
made out of a cost-benefit evaluation by a utility-maximizing individual taking a budget 
constraint into consideration. The costs refer to the monetary expenses incurred to facilitate 
the movement, and hence are closely related to the distance of the movement, while the 
benefits correspond to the monetary gains therefrom (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998). Based 
on the theoretical model assuming full employment, the earlier proponents hold that the 
benefits come solely from the wage differential between the two regions. For instance, Hicks 
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(1932, p.76) concludes that “…differences in net economic advantages chiefly in wages are 
the main causes of migration”.  Harris and Todaro (1970) later introduce the likelihood of 
unemployment into the theoretical argument and propose that individuals consider the 
expected return which should be the expected earning weighted by the probability to get 
employed in the receiving region, rather than the actual earning.   
 
The neoclassical approach further regards the observed migration flow as the cumulative 
result of individual decisions, and thereby argues that migration flow can be explained by the 
differentials both in wage and in unemployment rate. Since the wage and the unemployment 
rate are both assumed to be at the equilibrium level of the respective labor market, this 
approach holds per se that the demand and supply in the labor markets of both the sending 
region and the receiving region play a big role in determining the migration flow at the 
macro level. (Gorter et al., 1998) 
2.1.2 Human capital theory of migration 
 
The human capital approach developed by Sjaastad (1962) based on the human capital 
model formulated by Becker (1962) also contains a cost-benefit evaluation at the individual 
level in the argument. What is quite different is that this approach treats migration as an 
investment decision. Individuals calculate the present discounted value of expected return 
net of the discounted costs of movement in every region including the home location, and 
choose thereupon to migrate or not and where to migrate. The costs of movement, regarded 
as indispensable to this “investment”, include: 1) monetary costs, such as the material costs 
of traveling, the costs of maintenance during moving and job-seeking and the opportunity 
costs of the job left behind in the home location; 2) psychological costs, arising from cutting 
old ties like family and friends and from forging new ones in the destination region; 3) 
information costs, of getting oneself acquainted with the situation in the destination region 
and getting oneself adapted to the new labor market there. The benefits are still linked to the 
earning differential between the sending and the receiving region. (Bauer and Zimmermann, 
1998; Massey et al., 1993) 
 
Burda (1995) and Bauer (1995) later introduce into the model uncertainty about the wage 
differential and about the costs of migration respectively. Based on that, they put forward a 
concept called “option of waiting”, which is borrowed from the literature on the investment 
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behavior of firms (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 for an overview), and argue that given the 
uncertainty regarding the economic environment, the individual may choose to wait for the 
new information about the real return and costs related to migration.  
 
Many scholars think that the human capital theory and the neoclassical approach can be 
integrated into one framework. Massey et al. (1993) imbed the human capital theory into the 
big category of neoclassical economics of migration, while Bauer and Zimmermann (1998) 
believe that Harris-Todaro-model can be integrated into the framework of human capital 
theory. Notwithstanding, it should be noted that the main essence of human capital theory 
lies in its emphasis on heterogeneity of individuals and in turn on the effects of their 
socioeconomic characteristics. It argues that every individual evaluates the costs and returns 
differently, and hence that individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics may have 
different propensities to migrate. For instance, individuals with different skills may have 
different expected remunerations and face different expected likelihood of employment in 
the receiving region. Elder individuals may appear more reluctant to migrate for the higher 
psychological costs and for the shorter span of time that they could enjoy the gains. 
Individuals with higher education might have higher propensity to migrate because they bear 
lower information costs with their higher abilities to collect and process related information. 
(Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998)  
 
To sum it up, following human capital theory of migration, in initiating migration, not only 
aggregate variables such as wage and unemployment rate play a role, factors at more micro 
level like age, education, language, and skills are also active.  
2.1.3 The new economics of migration 
 
Different from the two schools of migration theory mentioned above, which in general base 
their analysis on individuals, the new economics of migration states that migration decisions 
are made by families or households, “the larger units of related people, rather than by 
isolated individuals”, in a hope not only to maximize the expected income, but also to 
minimize risks as well as to alleviate constraints imposed by a variety of market failures 
(Massey et al., 1993). Scholars of this school argue that families or households may employ 
a risk-sharing scheme of sending family members to another labor market where wages, 
employment situation and other economic conditions are probably negatively or weakly 
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correlated with those in the home region, so that their economic well-being can still be 
maintained through remittances in case of deterioration of local economy (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1998). Moreover, the new economics of migration underlines the concept of 
“relative deprivation”, stating that families or households might send out members to reduce 
this relative deprivation, that is, to improve income relative to other households or a 
reference household (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998; Massey et al., 1993). 
 
Hence, apart from wage and employment differentials, the new economics of migration also 
regards the risk habit of households which corresponds to the propensity to diversify risks, 
the existence of market failure in the sending region, as well as the income distribution in the 
origin place as the explanatory factors for migration.  
2.1.4 Migration system theory 
 
Migration system theory proposes existence of migration system, where two or more places 
or countries are linked to each other through flows and counter flows of people (Kulu-
Glasgow, 1992). With a dynamic and more macro perspective, it formulates that apart from 
the most micro and atomistic level, where the individual is the active decision maker subject 
to different influences in the system, migration flows should be studied at the national level 
in addition, where political, demographic, economic and social dimensions respond to the 
feedbacks and adjustments that stem from migration itself, exert a continuous effect and 
hence constitute a dynamic mechanism which Myrdal (1957) called “cumulative causation” 
(Gorter et al., 1998).  
 
In particular, the theory highlights the effect of network. Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) point out 
that networks of institutions and individuals connect various countries together into a 
coherent migration system, where networks at the origin and at the destination restrain or 
encourage migration through the provision of economic and social support, and networks 
between the two act as a channel for information, migrants, remittances and cultural norms 
(Gorter et al., 1998). This system is dynamic, in that network, defined as sets of interpersonal 
ties such as ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin (Massey et al., 1993), 
elicits migration, hence reduces risks and costs in terms of psychology and information for 
the potential migrants and in turn further instigates migration.  
 
7 
  
In effect, migration system approach is more a conceptual framework than a specific theory. 
It considers such a variety of macro and micro factors at multiple levels that it can 
encompass many other migration theories. The political context in its discussion includes 
exit, entry and settlement policies, while Zolberg (1989), in the so-called regulatory 
approach, also emphasizes the importance of borders and regulations and states that it is the 
policy of potential recipient countries that determines whether a migration movement can 
take place and of what kind. The social context discusses welfare differentials, whereas 
Freeman (1986), in the welfare state approach, poses that differences in welfare system can 
constitute attracting magnets for residents in less prosperous societies and at the same time 
create a demand for foreign labor in that introducing foreign labor is “the only real 
alternative to the elimination of the privileges of the indigenous work force”. (Gorter et al., 
1998) 
 
Furthermore, its emphasis on the analysis at the national level also wins echoes from other 
theories. While highlighting structural factors such as socioeconomic and political 
developments, the historical-structural approach, represented by Goss and Lindquist (1995), 
holds that migration stems from the changes in production organization brought about by the 
pressures and counter pressures in national economies.  And Piore (1979), in his dual labor 
market theory, states more explicitly that the key and decisive role in initiating migration is 
shouldered by the built-in demand for immigrant labor in receiving regions which results 
from four fundamental characteristics advanced societies usually boast, namely, structural 
inflation, motivational problems, economic dualism, and the demography of labor supply.  
 
Generally speaking, neoclassical theory and human capital theory both base their analysis on 
the micro level of individual decision, while the latter focuses on socioeconomic 
characteristics such as skills and language in addition to the differentials in wages and 
employment conditions which the former mainly considers. The new economics of migration 
employs a more macro level of analysis of families or households and regards migration as a 
household decision to minimize risks to family income or to overcome various constraints on 
family production activities, whereas migration system theory proposes an intertwined 
framework discussing migration both at the micro level of individual and at the macro level 
of nation or society with a wide variety of factors taken into consideration.  As a conclusion 
for this subsection, we present below a table revised from Gorter et al. (1998, p.12) to 
epitomize what has been discussed above.  
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Table 2-1: A typology of theoretical approaches regarding causes of 
international migration 
Theory Level of analysis Explanatory variables 
Neoclassical theory Micro level, individual Wage, employment 
Human capital theory Micro level, individual 
Wage, employment, age, education, 
language, skill 
The new economics of 
migration 
Macro level, family or 
household 
Wage, employment, risk habit of 
household,  income distribution and 
market failure in the origin 
Migration system theory 
Micro level, individual 
& Macro level, nation or 
society 
Economic: wage, employment, price 
Social: welfare, migrant networks 
Political: exit, entry and settlement 
policy, international relations 
Demographic: population 
 
Source: Revised and reproduced from Gorter, Nijkamp and Poot 1998, p. 12.  
2.2 Empirical findings related to the causes of international 
migration 
 
Most empirical studies of international migration use aggregate data due to the lack of 
available micro data sets or insufficient computer facilities. In light of this and considering 
that our analysis in the later section will also be based upon a macro data set, we will here 
only discuss the empirical findings using aggregate data. Down below is a brief review of 
those studies, organized and sorted by the explanatory variables that they touch upon. 
2.2.1 Income or wages 
 
Most studies have found a statistically significant and positive effect of income or wages in 
the destination region (Hartog and Vriend, 1989; Katseli and Glytsos, 1989; Lundborg, 
1991a; Quigley, 1972) and a negative effect of wages and income in the origin (Lundborg, 
1991a; Katseli and Glytsos, 1989; Quigley, 1972). Considering the combined effect of the 
income or wages in the receiving and the sending region, most studies have concluded that 
there exists a positive relationship between migration and the income differential (Eriksson, 
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1989; Faini and Venturini, 1994; Geary and O Grada, 1989; Molle and van Mourik, 1989; 
Poot, 1995; Rotte and Vogler, 1998).  
 
Faini and Venturini (1994) have looked in particular into the non-linear influence of income 
level on migration and found a positive coefficient on the income level of the sending region 
while that of its square being negative. This thereby suggested existence of a hump-shaped 
pattern of migration with respect to the home country‟s income implies that in the early 
stages of development, improvements in the sending country‟s economic well-being increase 
migration, rather than reduce it, the mechanism of which might be carried out through 
alleviating the financial and educational constraints which previously prevented many 
would-be migrants from moving aboard. (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998) 
 
Introducing into the regression income or wages which are weighted by the inverse of the 
unemployment rates in a hope to foster a proxy for expected income gains, Straubhaar 
(1988) have found a statistically highly significant influence of the expected income gains on 
migration flow.  
 
As to the importance of the impact of income or wages, Boehning (1970) showed that wage 
differential is the main determinant in migration, particularly when labour demand pressure 
is roughly the same in the sending and the receiving country. 
2.2.2 Employment opportunities 
 
However, findings with regard to employment opportunities fail to reach a consensus, no 
matter whether unemployment rates or employment rates are used as proxies. Molle and van 
Mourik (1989) and Lundborg (1991a) posited an insignificant effect on migration of 
unemployment rate in the receiving region and of that in the sending region respectively. 
Katseli and Glytsos (1989) found a positive relationship between the employment 
opportunities in the sending region and the size of migration and a negative correlation 
between that in the receiving region and the size of migration flow and questioned whether 
individuals are attracted to regions which boast a shortage of jobs. By contrast, the argument 
of the negative effect of unemployment rate in the receiving region and the positive effect of 
that in the sending region on migration still gain support from some of the other empirical 
evidences (Eriksson, 1989; Faini and Venturini, 1994; Hartog and Vriend, 1989; Lundborg, 
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1991a; Poot, 1995). Furthermore, some empirical studies even suggest that “employment 
rates are more important in determining the migration decision than are wages or income 
levels” (Greenwood, 1975; Greenwood, 1981; Levy and Wadycki, 1973; Waldorf and 
Esparza, 1988).  
2.2.3 Distance 
 
The conclusion regarding the effect of distance is quite unanimous. Poot (1995) as well as 
Molle and van Mourik (1989) manifested a statistically significant and negative influence of 
the distance from the origin to the destination on migration flows. Most scholars hold that 
this negative influence lends support to the theoretical suggestion that costs and risks of the 
movement play a role in migration decision. Some researchers further point out that it is 
mainly the costs and risks of obtaining the relevant information that facilitate the impact of 
distance on migration, which is firmly backed-up by the empirical finding of Schwartz 
(1973), who examined the influence of age and education on the distance elasticity of 
migration for internal migrants in the US and found an insignificant effect of age and a 
negative coefficient of the level of education on the distance elasticity.  
2.2.4 Migration network 
 
The attitude towards the effect of network is quite straightforward. It is mostly held that the 
stock of migrants from a particular origin in a destination is positively correlated with 
subsequent migration (Eriksson, 1989; Faini and Venturini, 1994; Lundborg, 1991a; Quigley, 
1972; Rotte and Vogler, 1998; Zimmermann, 1994). Zimmermann (1994) in particular 
emphasized the importance of the network effect. Using lagged net immigration as the proxy, 
his regression on net immigration to Germany from Yugoslavia and Turkey, the two non-EU 
member states, yielded that the lagged migration coefficient dominates the immigration 
process.  
2.2.5 Education and age 
 
Most empirical findings agree on that migration increases with mean education and 
decreases with mean age of migrants (Katseli and Glytsos, 1989). 
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2.2.6 Policy and regulation 
 
Zimmermann (1994) argues that in the case of Europe, immigration is largely driven by 
policy measures and that relative wages and employment thereby do not matter much. In his 
standard OLS regression of net immigration from the main recruitment countries such as 
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia to Germany, different parameters for 
the period up to 1973 and for that after 1973 were allowed, in a hope to capture the impact of 
the policy and practice of recruitment in Germany which came to a stop in 1973. The results 
confirmed different patterns of immigration before and after 1973.  
 
 Below is a reproduced and revised table from Bauer and Zimmermann (1998, p. 114) to 
present the conclusion of those empirical findings with regard to the most common variables.  
 
Table 2-2: Signs of coefficients in econometric studies using aggregate data 
 Country 
Y 
in j 
Y 
in i 
rel 
Y 
U 
in j 
U 
in i 
rel 
U 
Age D 
MS 
in j 
Quigley (1972) Sweden + -       + 
Rotte and Vogler 
(1998) 
Germany   +     - + 
Lundborg (1991a) Sweden + -  - 0    + 
Waldorf and Esparze 
(1998) 
Germany   0   -    
Molle and van Mourik 
(1989) 
Europe   + 0    -  
Geary and O Grada 
(1989) 
U.S.   +       
Eriksson (1989) Sweden   +  + +   + 
Hartog and Vriend 
(1989) 
Netherlands +   -      
Katseli and Glytsos 
(1989) 
Germany + -  + -  -   
Faini and Venturini 
(1994) 
Europe  + + - +    + 
Poot (1995) Australia   + - +   -  
 
Source: Revised and reproduced from Bauer and Zimmermann 1998, p. 114. 
Note: 1, Y: Income or wages; rel Y: Income differential; U: Employment opportunities; rel U: Employment 
opportunity differential; S: Education; D: Distance between destination and source; MS: Network variables; j: 
Receiving country; I: Sending country. 2, The + sign denotes a positive relationship, the – sign negative and 0 
statistically insignificant. 
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2.3 The issue of welfare benefits 
 
Generally speaking, welfare benefits do not stand in the priority list of variables that 
researchers look into when seeking for the causes of migration. Furthermore, possibly due to 
the difficulty to conceptualize and compare welfare benefits in the international context, 
most of the researches that do examine the impact of welfare benefits are primarily based on 
internal migration, and mostly the internal migration within United States. In spite of this, 
we still present below a brief literature review of theoretical and empirical approaches that 
focus on welfare benefits regardless of whether they pose in the international realm or not, 
which we hope to draw upon later in our theoretical and empirical discussion in the 
forthcoming chapters. 
 
Most of the researches that concern welfare benefits still base themselves on the 
conventional rational-choice model of migration discussed above, in which utility-
maximizing individuals or families engage in a cost-benefit calculation when deciding 
whether to move and where to move and come up with a final decision which can maximize 
their quality of life (utility) (Da Vanzo, 1981; Fischer et al., 1997; Schram and Soss, 1999). 
What is different or new is that they hold welfare benefits as one of the important active, if 
not key, factors in this cost-benefit evaluation. 
 
The empirical findings regarding the effect of welfare benefits on migration are inconclusive 
in effect. Some findings claim that welfare benefits are magnets, in that they pull agents 
away from origins with lower welfare benefits and that places with higher welfare benefits 
appear to be more attractive to migrants than other peers do (Albritton, 1989; Blank, 1988; 
Borjas, 1999; Clark, 1990; De Jong et al., 2005; Dye, 1990; Gramlich and Lauren, 1984; 
Peterson and Rom, 1990; Schram and Soss, 1999). On the contrary, other findings hold that 
the effect of welfare benefits on migration is rather weak or at least ambiguous (Beale, 1971; 
Cebula, 1979; De Jong and Donnelly, 1973; Hanson and Hartman, 1994; Levine and 
Zimmermann, 1995; Long, 1974; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Schram et al., 1998; Steiner, 
1971; Sternlieb and Indik, 1973; Walker, 1994) 
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3.  A Migration Model 
The model we formulate below is primarily based on Hatton (1995) and Faini and Venturini 
(1994). In short, it incorporates four important features: 1), uncertainty is introduced into the 
migration decision and thus the agents care more about the expected terms of the variables; 
2), heterogeneity of agents is highlighted; 3), the formations of those variables in discussion, 
in particular, wage, employment rate and welfare benefits, have the Markov chain property; 
4) the importance of time gets due attention. In the following section, we discuss two cases 
subsequently, the static case, where time finds no role and where the first and the second 
features are most underscored, and the semi-dynamic case, where particular emphases are 
imposed on the last two features mentioned above. 
3.1 Static case without time connotation 
 
Formally, we assume that the individual‟s utility is given by: 
U=U(yi, fi)     (1) 
where yi and fi denote respectively the income and the amenities in region i, which is either 
the sending region s, or the receiving region d for a potential migrant. The income, yi, is 
equivalent to wage, wi, weighted by the probability of employment, ei, i.e. yi= wiei. 
Amenities, while encompassing miscellaneous qualitative factors, can be expressed as an 
increasing function of welfare benefits, bi, the key focus of this paper, namely, fi=g(bi), g
‟
b≥0. 
Considering people‟s intrinsic preference over staying at their original residence place, we 
assume that amenities are evaluated to be larger in the origin region of the potential migrant, 
i.e. fs>fd. Hence the reason why people ever think about migration is that there exists a 
positive income differential between the receiving region and the sending region, i.e., yd>ys. 
 
Introducing uncertainty, migration will occur if EU(yd, fd)≥EU(ys,fs). Expanding EU(yd, fd) 
and EU(ys,fs) in a first-order Taylor series around (Eyd, Efd), we will have: 
EU(yd, fd) =U(Eyd, Efd) + Uy * E(yd - Eyd) + Uf * E(fd - Efd)     (2) 
EU(ys, fs) = U(Eyd, Efd) + Uy * E(ys – Eyd) + Uf * E(fs – Efd)     (3) 
where the derivatives of the utility function, Uy and Uf, are evaluated at Eyd and Efd.  
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Since Eyd, Efd are constants, E(yd – Eyd) and E(fd –Efd) will only take the value of 0. Hence, 
the migration incentive condition of EU(yd, fd)≥EU(ys,fs) becomes: 
0≥ Uy * E(ys – Eyd) + Uf * E(fs – Efd)     (4) 
or: 
ds
ds
ds
ds
f
y
EyEy
EfEf
EyyE
EffE
U
U
)(
)(
      (5) 
 
Assume the utility function has the general CES form as: 
U=[(1-δ)yi
ρ
 + δfi
ρ
]
1/ρ 
    (6) 
where 1/(1-ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between y and f, while δ is the distributional 
parameter associated with f. We can rewrite the migration incentive condition as: 
1)(*
1
d
d
sd
ds
Ef
Ey
EyEy
EfEf
      (7) 
 
Allowing for the heterogeneity among agents, we assume that γ = (1-δ) / δ is distributed 
within the home country population according to a Pareto distribution function: 
10 )(
x
xo
       (8) 
where x0 and θ are parameters of the distribution function
1
. The share of migrants in the 
home country population can thereby be given as: 
zxd
x
x
zob
z
0
10
0
)()(Pr       (9) 
where z = (Eyd/Efd) 
1-ρ 
(Efs-Efd) / (Eyd-Eys) . 
 
Up to now, we haven‟t considered the cost of migration. We assume that the would-be 
migrants finance the costs of migration from their wealth. Hence, they are faced with a 
constraint given by Ai ≥ Ci, where Ai represents the wealth of the individual and Ci denotes 
the costs of migration for which we assume no uncertainty for simplification. Intuitively, Ci 
increases with the distance of the movement, di, and, following the discussion in Chapter 2,  
decreases with the stock of the agent‟s “folk people” in the destination region, si, and with 
the similarity between the languages in use in those two locations in discussion, li. Formally,  
 
1 
See Faini and Venturini (1994). The Pareto distribution function is defined over the interval (x0, ∞). 
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Ci= C(di, si, li), C
‟
d≥0, C
‟
s≤0, and C
‟
l≤0. 
 
Therefore, the number of actual migrants would be the intersection of the two relevant sets 
of agents, those who are willing to migrate (for which the migration incentive condition 
given by equation (7) holds) and those who are able to move (for which the migration 
feasibility constraint of Ai≥Ci holds). Hence we have the share of actual migrants in the 
home country population as follows: 
z C
dAdAfCAZob ),(),(Pr       (10) 
where f(γ, A) is the joint density function of γ and A. Assuming that A is again distributed 
among the population according to a Pareto distribution function and that A and γ are 
independently distributed, we can show that the actual number of migrants, M, as a share of 
the home country„s population, P, can be expressed as below: 
Cxzx
P
M
10      (11) 
where x1 is the lower limit of the support of the distribution of A. We also assume that an 
increase in the general income level of the home country will shift the distribution of the 
wealth to the right. More precisely, we postulate that: 
x1=(Ews)
α
(Ees)
β
       (12) 
where α, β>0, indicating that an increase in the general income level in the home country, 
either resulting from an increase in wage or from an increase in employment rate, will relax 
the constraint.  
 
Substituting the expressions for z, x1 and C into equation (11) and taking logarithms yields: 
ln(M/P) = θlnx0 – θlnz + ψlnx1 – ψlnC 
            =  θlnx0 – θln(Efs – Efd) + θln(Eyd – Eys) – θ(1– ρ)lnEyd + θ(1– ρ)lnEfd + ψαlnEws  
+ ψβlnEes – ψlnC(d, s, l)                        (13) 
3.2 Semi-dynamic case with time connotation 
 
Now we consider the dynamic case where time counts. Assume that most of the factors that 
are embodied by amenities which f represents, such as the possibility of hanging around with 
relatives, old friends and other “folk people”, are qualitative and hence constant over time in 
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general. We postulate thereby that the only uncertainty in amenities lies in the welfare 
benefits. Mathematically, this claim is equal to the formulation that Efi = Eg(bi) = g(Ebi). In 
addition, we assume that wage, employment rate and welfare benefits observe the following 
AR (1) mechanism
2
: 
wtd = D1wt-1d + Dεt 
                                                           etd = D2et-1d + Dµt 
                                                           wts = S1wt-1s + Sεt 
                                                           ets = S2et-1s + Sµt 
                                                           btd = D3bt-1d + Dλt 
                                                           bts = S3bt-1s+ Sλt 
where D1, D2, S1, S2 are constants, error terms Dε, Sε, Dλ, Sλ, Dµ, Dµ are normally 
distributed with an expected value of 0 and a variance of ζ2dε, ζ
2
sε, ζ
2
dλ, ζ
2
sλ, ζ
2
dµ, ζ
2
sµ 
respectively, and there exists no correlation either between any of these error terms or 
between any of these error terms and the lagged variable in discussion.  Take Dε for an 
example, we literally assume cov(Dε, wt-1d)=cov(Dε, et-1d)=cov(Dε, wt-1s)=cov(Dε, et-
1s)=cov(Dε, bt-1d)=cov(Dε, bt-1s)=cov(Dε, Sε)=cov(Dε, Dµ)=cov(Dε, Sµ)=cov(Dε, 
Dλ)=cov(Dε, Sλ)=0 and Dε ~ N(0, ζ2dε). Hence, in a give time period, t, we have: 
Etytd = Etwtd * Etetd + cov(wtd, etd) = D1wt-1d * D2et-1d + D1D2cov(wt-1d, et-1d) 
           Etyts = Etwts * Etets + cov(wts, ets) = S1wt-1s * S2et-1s + S1S2cov(wt-1s, et-1s)   
           Etftd = Etg(btd) = g(Etbtd) =g(D3bt-1d) 
           Etfts = Etg(bts) = g(Etbts) =g(S3bt-1s) 
 
Therefore, z in the static context now becomes zt given as: 
ln zt = (1– ρ)lnEtyd – (1–ρ)lnEtfd + ln(Etfs – Etfd) –ln(Etyd – Etys) 
        =(1–ρ)ln[D1wt-1d * D2et-1d + D1D2cov(wt-1d, et-1d)] – (1–ρ)ln(g(D3bt-1d))  
+ ln(Etfs – Etfd) – ln(Etyd – Etys)                  (14) 
In a simpler context where we tentatively assume the independence of wage and 
employment rate, we have: 
ln zt  =(1– ρ)ln(D1wt-1d * D2et-1d) – (1– ρ)ln (g(D3bt-1d)) + ln(Etfs – Etfd) – ln(Etyd – Etys)       
         = (1– ρ)lnD1 + (1– ρ)ln(wt-1d) + (1–ρ)lnD2 + (1– ρ)ln(et-1d) – (1– ρ)ln(g(D3bt-1d)) 
 + ln(Etfs – Etfd) – ln(Etyd – Etys)         (15)                     
 
2 
Here, we implicitly assume that the formations of wage, employment rate and welfare benefits have the 
Markov chain property, in that only the situation or information in the previous period matters.   
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In this semi-dynamic case, if an individual plans to migrate in period t, he will have to bear 
the costs, Cit, which are determined by the distance he plans to move across in this time t, dit, 
by the similarity of languages evaluated at time t, lit, and by the extent of other risks and 
costs which he projects to face taking into consideration the existing stock of his folk people 
in the destination region that he can draw upon after the migration is realized, sit-1.  
Mathematically, we can formulate this into Cit = C(dit, sit-1, lit). To finance for the costs, the 
agent again relies on his wealth, Ait. Hence, the migration feasibility constraint now becomes 
Ait ≥ Cit. In the same argument, we now have instead: 
x1t = (Ewts)
α
 (Eets)
β 
= (S1wt-1s)
α
 (S2et-1s)
β
 
 
 Therefore the equation (13) in the static case will turn out to be as follows:
 
ln(M/Pt) = θlnx0t – θlnzt + ψlnx1t – ψlnCt 
               = – θ(1– ρ)ln(wt-1d ) – θ(1– ρ)ln(et-1d) + ψαlnwt-1s + ψβlne t-1s  
                  + θ(1– ρ)ln(g(D3bt-1d))  – ψlnC(dt,st-1, lt) – θln(Etfs – Etfd) + θln(Etyd – Etys)  
+ θlnx0t + ψαlnS1+ ψβlnS2– θ(1– ρ)lnD1– θ(1– ρ)lnD2      (16) 
 
To conclude, we now have derived two equations regarding the share of migrants in the 
source country population, for static case and for the quasi-dynamic case respectively. They 
state that the share of migrants in the source country population is determined by wages, 
employment rates, and amenities in the sending region and the receiving region, by welfare 
benefits and stock of migrants in the receiving region, and by distance of movement as well 
as similarity of languages. However, what we formulate above is notional supply of migrants. 
In reality, the evolution of migration is also determined by the demand in destination country 
in addition. Following Faini and Venturini (1994), we further extend the model. Assume that 
the rationale of the behavior of policy-makers in destination country can be illustrated 
formally as follows: 
Min L(M – Ld, E)               (17) 
s.t.:  M = M(M
s
, E)  M
‟
m>0, M
‟
s<0       (18) 
where M, M
s
,L
d
,
 
E denotes respectively the actual amount of migrants, the notional supply of 
migrants, the desired amount of migrants from the perspective of destination country and the 
expenditure incurred in implementing effective migration controls. Hence, what we postulate 
is that policy-makers try to minimize a loss function through the manipulation of the 
difference between the actual amount of migrants and the desired amount and of the 
expenditure of migration controls. The actual amount of migrants is formulated as a function 
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of the notional supply of migrants, which is given by equation (13) or (16), and the 
expenditure on migration controls. 
 
Since the desired amount of migrants is certainly closely related to the labor demand in 
destination country, which in turn is determined by the existing labor force and assumptively 
by the economic growth, we can write L
d
 as below: 
L
d 
= d(LFd, GDPgrd)   L
‟
lf<0, L
‟
gr>0 
where LFd and GDPgrd represents respectively labor force and GDP growth rate in 
destination country.    
 
Solving the optimization problem given by equation (17) and (18), we will have an equation 
for the actual number of migrants which includes as right hand variables those terms appear 
as determinants of the notional supply of migrants in equation (13) or (16) and labor force as 
well as GDP growth rate in destination country in addition.  
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4.  Data 
 
The data we have collected encompass variables for 15 developed European countries, 
namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K., and 12 transition countries, i.e. 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Of those 15 developed countries, 13 are EU member states, 
belonging to the group often addressed as EU15. Due to the lack of data concerning 
migration flow, we leave out Luxembourg and Ireland, the rest two of that group. However, 
such a treatment should be justifiable considering the limited territory and relative 
insignificance of the former and the peripheral geographic position of the latter. The two 
substitutes for them are selected from the “club” of four non-EU EEA member states. 
Understandably, we choose the two relatively more important entities, Norway and 
Switzerland. Standing almost in the center of Europe, Switzerland has long before been a 
destination for migrants and hence holds a high relevance to our study of migration. Norway, 
one of the well-recognized welfare state paradigms, certainly boasts a particular interest 
since the key focus of our study would be imposed on the discussion of the effect of welfare 
benefits on migration. Among the 12 transition countries, 10 are usually addressed as CEECs 
(Central and Eastern European countries), the terminology of which is a combination of 
Visagrad-4 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Poland), the Balkan-3 
(Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia), and the Baltic-3 (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 8 of 
those 10 CEECs were admitted into EU in 2004, together with Cyprus and Malta, while the 
rest two outliers of CEECs, Bulgaria and Romania, followed suit in 2007.  
 
Internal European migration has long been trickling even if we narrow our scope to the flow 
from central and eastern regions to western regions after the Second World War, This 
tradition of emigration of east Europeans is intertwined with the dislocation in the wake of 
the war and with the guest-worker arrangement afterwards aiming at fuelling for the 
excessive demand for labor in the western countries. Our particular interest, however, lies in 
the east-west migration within Europe in a context of relatively free flow of labor. Hence, we 
would limit our horizon to the period starting from 1989 when the communist community in 
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the Central and Eastern Europe dissolved and the “boycott” of east-west migration was 
consequently lifted up to a large extent.  
 
Therefore, to sum it up, what we examine in this section is the data of migration from 12 
European transition countries into 15 developed European countries during 1989-2006, and 
those of other related economic and social variables for those 27 countries during this period.  
To insure a better illustration, we allocate those data into four groups, migration, welfare, 
economic variables, as well as social variables, and present them subsequently down below. 
4.1 Migration 
 
Brosnan and Poot (1987) point out that analysis based on net migration, defined as the 
absolute difference between emigration and immigration in a region, will lead to an 
overestimation of the effects of the variables which have same impacts on the flows in both 
directions and to an underestimation of the effects of those variables with different impacts 
on the flows. This is because emigration and immigration flow might be correlated and 
hence models using net migration flows might fail to separate the various push and pull 
factors which are responsible for the gross migration flows in both directions (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1998). Therefore, we collect data on gross migration flow instead. Extracting 
data related to migration from Eurostat, OECD Source and WDI, we compile a three-
dimension (year, source and destination) panel data of gross migration inflows from 12 
European transition countries into 15 developed European countries during the period of 
1989-2006.  
 
With such a wide scope as 27 countries and with relatively long period in focus as 18 years, 
our panel data of gross migration flows turns out inevitably to be quite unbalanced. 
However, for several specific countries, namely, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Germany in 
the group of destination countries, as well as Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria in the 
group of source countries, the data is very neat.  Below present we three figures, primarily 
based on the data for those “statistically well-behaved” countries mentioned above, to 
illustrate the intricate three dimensions of the migration flow panel data and to forge a brief 
picture of the internal east-west European migration during 1989-2006. Figure 4-1 shows the 
time-serie behaviors of gross migration inflows into Germany from Hungary, Poland and 
Romania respectively.  Figure 4-2 focuses on the gross migration inflows into Austria from 
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12 source countries in the year 1996, 2001 and 2006. Figure 4-3 presents the gross migration 
flows from Poland into 15 destination countries in the year 1992, 1998, and 2004.  
 
Figure 4-1: Inflow into Germany from Hungary, Poland and Romania, 
1989-2006, in thousands 
 
Source: Compiled from OECD, Eurostat and World Bank WDI.  
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Figure 4-2: Inflow into Austria, year 1996, 2001 and 2006, in thousands 
 
Source: Compiled from OECD, Eurostat and World Bank WDI.  
 
Figure 4-3: Outflow from Poland, year 1992, 1998 and 2004, in thousands 
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Since what we are going to use as the dependent variable in Chapter 5 is the bilateral 
migration flow rate, which literally is the specific bilateral migration flow scaled down by 
the population of the corresponding source country, we present here Figure 4-4 which 
illustrates the time-serie sequences of the average bilateral migration outflow rates of 
specific source countries. In addition, we also examine how the bilateral migration flow rate 
evolves during the period in discussion in a broader context of intra-Europe rather than from 
the perspective of specific sources countries. Figure 4-5 offers a glimpse into this evolution. 
 
Figure 4-4: Average outflow rates of specific source countries, 1992-2006 
 
Source: Compiled from OECD, Eurostat and World Bank WDI.  
Note: The mean of outflow rate is calculated through summing the bilateral migration outflows of a specific 
source country over all destination countries in the available data and then dividing it by the population of that 
specific source country.  
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Figure 4-5: The evolution of bilateral migration flow rate during 
1992-2006 
 
Note: We run a simple regression and three regressions, controlling respectively for the fixed effect of 
destination country, that of source country, and that of both destination country and source country, of the 
bilateral migration flow rate or the rate of migration flow as what we define in the beginning of Chapter 5, in 
the logarithm form, on the year dummies for the period of 1992-2006. And we graph afterwards the 
coefficients on the year dummies yielded by those four regressions.  The reasons why we choose the rate of 
migration flow in logarithm as the dependent variable and why we employ these four regression specifications 
are elaborated in the beginning of Chapter 5. 
4.2 Welfare 
 
We employ two measures of welfare benefits offered in those15 destination countries. The 
first one is the total expenditure on social protection, following the standard approach in the 
literature. To guarantee the comparability, as is illustrated in Table 4-1, we collect data on 
the percentage that the total expenditure takes up in the specific national GDP. The second 
measure of welfare benefits that we use is welfare generosity index, developed by Lyle 
Scruggs. The data that we compile encompass the welfare generosity index for 12 countries, 
with Portugal, Greece and Spain excluded, and for the period of 1989-2002 (see Table 4-2). 
We also draw a set of graphs integrating and comparing those two measures of welfare 
benefits by country (see Figure 4-6), which we will refer back to later.  
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
 o
n
 y
e
a
r 
d
u
m
m
ie
s
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
pooled regression fixed effect, destination
fixed effect, source fixed effect, both
25 
  
Table 4-1: Total expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP 
for 15 developed European countries, 1990-2005 
 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Austria 26.1 26.3 26.8 28.1 28.8 28.8 28.7 28.6 
Belgium 26.4 27 27.7 29.3 28.7 27.4 28 27.4 
Denmark 28.2 29.1 29.7 31.5 32.5 31.9 31.2 30.1 
Finland 24.6 29.2 33.1 34.2 33.7 31.5 31.4 29.1 
France 27.3 27.9 28.7 30.4 30.2 30.3 30.6 30.4 
Germany  25.4 25.7 27.2 27.9 27.8 28.2 29.3 28.9 
Greece 22.9 21.5 21.2 22 22.1 19.9 20.5 20.8 
Italy 24 24.4 25.5 25.7 25.3 24.2 24.3 24.9 
Netherlands 31.1 31.1 31.6 32 31.4 30.6 29.6 28.7 
Norway 25.8 26.8 28 27.9 27.4 26.5 25.8 25.1 
Portugal 16.3 17.2 18.4 21 21.3 21 20.2 20.3 
Spain 19.9 21.2 22.4 24 22.8 21.6 21.5 20.8 
Sweden 33.1 34.3 37.1 37.9 36.5 34.3 33.6 32.7 
Switzerland 19.5 21 23 24.7 24.8 25.6 26.4 27.3 
U.K. 22.8 25.6 27.8 28.8 28.5 28 27.8 27.3 
                  
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Austria 28.3 28.7 28.1 28.4 29 29.3 29 28.8 
Belgium 27.1 27 26.5 27.3 28 29.1 29.3 29.7 
Denmark 30 29.8 28.9 29.2 29.7 30.9 30.9 30.1 
Finland 27 26.2 25.1 24.9 25.6 26.5 26.6 26.7 
France 30.1 29.9 29.5 29.6 30.4 30.9 31.3 31.5 
Germany  28.8 29.2 29.3 29.4 30 30.3 29.6 29.4 
Greece 21.7 22.7 23.5 24.1 23.8 23.6 23.6 24.2 
Italy 24.6 24.8 24.7 24.9 25.3 25.8 26 26.4 
Netherlands 27.8 27.1 26.4 26.5 27.6 28.3 28.3 28.2 
Norway 26.9 26.9 24.4 25.4 26 27.2 25.9 23.9 
Portugal 20.9 21.4 21.7 22.7 23.7 24.1 24.7 .. 
Spain 20.2 19.8 20.3 20 20.3 20.4 20.6 20.8 
Sweden 32 31.7 30.7 31.2 32.2 33.2 32.7 32 
Switzerland 27.3 27.3 26.9 27.6 28.5 29.1 29.3 29.2 
U.K. 26.7 26.2 26.9 27.3 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.8 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: Germany includes ex-GDR from 1991. 
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Table 4-2: Welfare generosity index for 12 developed European countries, 
1988-2002 
 
Year Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany  
1988 27.2 31.5 35.4 35.9 32.1 28.8 
1989 27.6 32.2 37.4 34.8 32.2 28.6 
1990 27.4 32.5 36.3 34.4 31.9 27.9 
1991 28.3 32.3 36.6 34.3 31.6 29.2 
1992 28.5 32.5 36.9 35.0 31.5 29.5 
1993 28.6 32.4 37.2 33.8 31.4 29.3 
1994 28.2 32.9 38.2 34.9 31.6 29.1 
1995 28.3 33.2 36.8 33.7 30.6 28.9 
1996 28.9 32.8 36.5 33.1 30.6 28.5 
1997 29.2 32.3 35.9 32.1 27.9 28.0 
1998 29.2 32.8 35.1 32.2 27.8 27.5 
1999 29.1 32.6 35.2 31.3 27.8 27.7 
2000 28.9 32.6 35.4 30.7 28.0 27.5 
2001 28.6 32.6 35.2 30.1 26.9 27.2 
2002 28.6 31.7 35.0 30.7 27.3 26.6 
              
Year Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland U.K. 
1988 22.3 35.4 41.5 45.1 30.1 18.0 
1989 23.9 36.3 41.4 44.7 29.1 19.8 
1990 21.3 35.4 41.1 42.5 28.7 20.0 
1991 21.9 36.1 40.9 42.9 26.3 20.2 
1992 23.7 35.4 40.9 43.2 27.0 20.2 
1993 24.7 35.1 41.0 43.2 26.3 20.6 
1994 24.0 34.2 41.2 42.0 27.5 19.7 
1995 23.4 34.4 40.3 42.2 27.8 22.0 
1996 24.4 35.0 40.1 40.7 24.1 19.9 
1997 23.6 34.5 40.2 39.7 21.7 20.9 
1998 23.7 35.0 41.0 39.6 20.9 20.9 
1999 25.5 35.5 41.2 36.9 20.1 21.4 
2000 26.7 35.8 41.6 36.2 19.6 21.4 
2001 26.8 35.6 41.8 35.7 18.8 21.6 
2002 27.3 34.2 41.8 35.7 18.6 22.3 
 
Source: http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm 
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Figure 4-6: Total expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP 
versus welfare generosity index, by country 
 
Source: Eurostat and http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm. 
4.3 Economic variables 
 
We also collect relevant data to reflect the general economic performance, the employment 
situation and the economic potential of those 27 countries. We use GDP per capita measured 
in PPP and dollars as the proxy of the pecuniary well-being and in a broader sense the 
current economic environment in the specific country.  
 
Following the standard approach, employment situation is represented by the unemployment 
rate. However, we collect data on labor force in addition, which through providing 
information about the existing potential insider employees helps to reveal the employment 
opportunity margin faced by “newcomers”. As to economic potential, we employ two sets of 
data, the GDP real growth rate and the GDP per capita growth rate, the latter of which is 
suggested by Alecke et al. (2001), to insinuate the momentum of economic growth, the 
extent to which the general well-being of residents would be improved in the near future and 
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hence literally the general scenario of the future economic performance in those countries in 
discussion. 
4.4 Social variables 
 
We include in our data set the country-specific stocks of migrants from 12 source countries 
in these 15 destination countries, which is generally agreed to be able to capture the effect of 
migration network in facilitating migration and in reducing the costs and risks that migrants 
care much, while taking into consideration the impact of past socioeconomic developments 
on migration (Jones, 1990). To calibrate other risks and costs that potential migrants usually 
take into consideration, we also compile data on the similarity of languages in destination 
and source region and on the geographic distance between the two. We construct a variable 
named language and assign to it values within a range of 0 to 5, which increases with the 
similarity of the languages in use in the receiving and the sending region. Table 4-3 shows in 
detail how the value for this variable is assigned. As to distance, following Van Wissen and 
Visser (1998), we use two variables. The former is a dummy variable called “common 
boundary” which takes the value of 1 if the two countries in discussion share a common 
border and 0 if otherwise. And the latter is the distance measured along a straight line 
between the capital cities of the two countries in concern in centimeters on a map with a 
scale of 1:10 million.  
 
Table 4-3: Values of the variable measuring similarity of languages 
 
Group Value Example 
Same language 5 Greece and Cyprus 
English 4 
U.K. and any other country in 
discussion 
Within the same subfamily or 
subdivision, the same branch 
and the same large language 
family 
3 
Italy and Romania 
Finland and Estonia 
Within the same branch of 
language family 
2 
France and Romania 
Finland and Hungary 
Within the same big language 
family 
1 Poland and Germany, etc. 
Not in the same language 
family 
0 Finland and Bulgaria, etc. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
 
Based on the theoretical and empirical discussion in Chapter 2, the semi-dynamic migration 
model in Chapter 3 and the data described in Chapter 4, we formulate the following 
regression equation:  
 ln(M/Psdt) =  φ1ln(GDPpct-1d )  + φ2ln(GDPpct-1s) + φ3ln(ut-1d) + φ4ln(ut-1s) + φ5ln(SEt-1d)   
+φ6ln(Stockt-1sd) + φ7ln(LFt-1d) + φ8ln(LFt-1s) + φ9ln(distsd) + φ10lansd + φ11combousd + φ12 
ln(GDPgrt-1d) + φ13ln(GDPgrt-1s) + φ14(GDPpcgrt-1d)
2
 + φ15(GDPpcgrt-1s)
2
 + ξt               (19) 
where M/Psdt, the dependent variable, denotes the ratio in per cent of the gross number of 
migrants that flow from the source country s to the destination country d to the population in 
the source country s, in the time period t
3
. GDPpct-1d and GDPpct-1s represents GDP per 
capita
4
, and ut-1d and ut-1s the unemployment rate, in the time period t-1, in the destination 
country and the source country respectively. SEt-1d measures welfare benefits in destination 
country in time period t-1, which in most cases below is represented by the total expenditure 
on social protection as a percentage of GDP which boasts better data in terms of neatness 
and coverage. Stockt-1sd is the stock of foreign population from the source country s in 
destination country d in time period t-1. Lansd and distsd stand for the similarity of languages 
and the distance between the destination country d and the source country s. Combou is a 
dummy variable examining whether the source country s and the destination country d share 
a common border. And ξ is the error term. 
 
The independent variables illustrated so far correspond literally to the explanatory factors for 
the notional supply of migrants postulated in equation (16). Notwithstanding, we have in 
addition LF, GDPgr and GDPpcgr, which denote labor force, GDP growth rate and GDP per 
capita growth rate respectively. Apart from the effect it may have on the labor demand for 
migrants in destination country, which we have discussed at the end of Chapter 3, the 
variable of labor force is relevant to our study for the following reasons. During the process 
of migration decision, agents can be myopic, caring more about the size of employment  
 
3 We will refer to this variable as “the rate of migration flow” in the discussion that follows. 
4 
There is a considerable discussion on whether income or wage indicators should be included in a migration 
equation (Hatton and Williamson, 1993). Faini and Venturini believe that, for medium and long-run migrations, 
income data may provide a better indication of the earning potentials of prospective migrants. Empirically, the 
use of either indicator does not seem to make much difference (Gould, 1979). 
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opportunity than the probability, or they might appear to be very far-sighted, studying the 
extent of competition they are going to face in the respective labor markets in the destination 
country and the source country. Including the lagged variable of labor force, which not only 
reflects the size of employment opportunity in general but also hints in particular the margin 
of employment opportunities in the destination country that will be left to the potential 
migrants, into the set of explanatory variables helps us take into consideration this myopia 
and farsightedness of the decision-making agents. In addition, the variable of labor force can 
also capture implicitly the information regarding the size of the destination country and the 
source country and thereby the effect of “scale” in attracting and in pushing out would-be 
migrants.  
 
We have discussed the role of labor demand for migrants in destination country in 
determining the actual amount of migrants and hence stressed the role of GDP growth rate in 
destination country therein. Yet, we have to admit that the actual amount of migrants may 
not stand clear of the labor demand in home country and hence of the GDP growth rate there. 
Therefore, to be on a safer ground, we include both GDPgrt-1d and GDPgrt-1s, the growth rate 
of GDP in time t-1 in the destination country and the source country.  
 
In the context of east-west European migration, where it is well-recognized that there exists 
a sizable expectation of convergence of Eastern and Central Europe and West Europe in 
terms of economy and many other aspects, precipitated by EU enlargement and other 
campaigns of support and aids, we find it also necessary to consider the “option of waiting” 
discussed in Chapter 2. Following Alecke et al. (2001), we include the squared per capita 
GDP growth rate, (GDPpcgrt-1d)
2
 and (GDPpcgrt-1s)
2
, to measure this “option of waiting”.    
   
It should be noticed that except those three that are constant over the time, all the 
independent variables are one period forward than the dependent variable. This is to a large 
extent due to our attempt to model migration from the perspective of individual rational 
decision
5
. Yet it also follows from the concern to circumvent the relative infeasibility of  
measuring explanatory variables in the beginning of the period when the counter effect of 
 
5
 The individual judgment regarding whether to migrate is normally not an ad hoc decision where present 
variables are taken into account. It is rather a longer-term process where expectations about potential costs and 
benefits are formed by carefully evaluating past income and expenditure experiences and assessing ties to 
existing migrant networks (Hille and Straubaaar, 2001). 
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migration hasn‟t been exerted, which is suggested by Greenwood and Sweetland (1972) to 
handle the problem of downward biased estimates using the end-of-period measures.  
 
Most of the independent variables in our regression equation are specified in logarithms. 
Many empiricists hold that double-logarithmic formulation boasts several statistical 
advantages in the discussion of migration. For one thing, it fits better to capture the non-
linear reaction of migration to the changes in the independent variables. Migration, when in 
the context of relatively free flow in particular, is believed to follow kind of saturation 
pattern and binded by an upper threshold (Hille and Straubhaar, 2001). For another, the 
double-logarithmic form can explain a larger share of the variance than other forms do. 
Besides, it is easier to interpret the coefficients since they stand for the elasticities with 
respect to each of the independent variables. Yet, apart from the consideration about what is 
mentioned above, our deployment of this log-log formulation stems also from our 
specification trial. Amongst linear form, log-linear form, linear-log form and several others, 
the log-log form stands relatively better, in terms of the significance of coefficients, the fit of 
the model and the behavior of the residual, the latter of which refers to the property of 
normal distribution in particular. Hence, considering in addition our theoretical model 
presented in Chapter 3, which also lends support thereupon, we utilize double-logarithmic 
formulation throughout the regressions.  
 
For regression tools, we use both pooled OLS and panel data regression. In the context of 
panel data, we try three approaches, i.e. grouping data by destination of flow, by source of 
flow and by the combination of destination and source of the flow. Running Hausman test on 
those three approaches yields that fixed-effect formulation is universally better. Hence, in the 
context of panel data regression, we employ fixed-effect analysis throughout. We also 
conduct other diagnostic tests to check autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and normality of 
residuals in all specifications. The Jarque-Bera statistic provides generally satisfactory 
evidence that the residuals are normally distributed, which constitutes a proper justification 
for the hypothesis testing and statistical reference that follow. And the results from the  
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests lead us to choose to run robust regressions on all 
specifications. 
 
In all, we try 28 specifications. Those specifications can be allocated into four big categories, 
the one with year dummies, the one with break and break interactions, the one using 
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different measures of welfare benefits, and the one with the exclusion of three outliers, 
namely, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Each category contains specifications using pooled data 
and the panel data grouped in three different ways. We will discuss those four categories 
subsequently down below. 
 
Before we go further into details about the regression results, we would like to present a 
summary table about all the variables that we are going to use in the regressions. Despite that 
the dependent variable and most of the independent variables in the regressions in the later 
section are formulated in logarithms, we describe here the relatively original data whose 
values are easier to interpret than otherwise. Note that except the last three variables that are 
mostly constant over time, most of the other independent variables are in lagged form.   
 
Table 5-1: Descriptions of variables 
Variable Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rate of migration flow 
 
614 0.000242 0.0006 2E-07 0.0061 
GDP per capita source 
PPP in dollars, 
lagged 
614 14216.81 6448.968 5225 32702 
GDP per capita destination 
PPP in dollars, 
lagged 
614 28539.38 4948.222 16939 41327 
Unemployment rate source %, lagged 614 10.9171 4.596284 3.3 20.9 
Unemployment rate destination  %, lagged 614 7.020847 3.119975 2.1 22.9 
Social protection extenditure 
destination 
% of GDP, lagged 614 28.04202 2.905728 20 37.9 
Welfare generosity index destination  lagged 381 32.33855 6.062025 18.63 43.178 
Stock of migrants destination thousands, lagged 614 12.57817 41.33895 0.005 326.6 
Labor force source thousands, lagged 614 6159.497 6053.294 152 17814 
Labor force destination  thousands, lagged 614 10142.14 11804.44 2182 40992 
GDP growth rate source %, lagged 614 4.750798 2.073083 0.2 10.8 
GDP growth rate destination %, lagged 614 2.53241 1.512733 0.1 15.5 
Per capita GDP growth rate source %, lagged 614 4.892541 2.396677 -2.14 12.37 
Per capita GDP growth rate 
destination 
%, lagged 614 1.940277 1.308552 -2.56 5.88 
BREAK dummy 614 0.267101 0.442806 0 1 
Distance centimeters 614 13.70879 7.431975 0.6 34.9 
Common border dummy 614 0.037459 0.190039 0 1 
Language   614 0.851792 0.748585 0 4 
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5.1 Determinants of migration flows 
 
The four specifications in this category are based on the regression equation down below:  
ln(M/Psdt) =  φ1ln(GDPpct-1d )  + φ2ln(GDPpct-1s) + φ3ln(ut-1d) + φ4ln(ut-1s) + φ5ln(SEt-1d) 
+φ6ln(Stockt-1sd) + φ7ln(LFt-1d) + φ8ln(LFt-1s) + φ9ln(distsd) + φ10lansd + φ11combousd + φ12 
ln(GDPgrt-1d) + φ13ln(GDPgrt-1s) + φ14(GDPpcgrt-1d)
2
 + φ15(GDPpcgrt-1s)
2
 + ∑φtYDt  + §t  (20)                                                                                                                                              
where YDt is the year dummy to control for the fixed year effect for the period 1992-2006 
and § the error term
6
.  
 
The results are reported in Table 5-2. Column 1 presents results from the regression on 
pooled data, while the rest three columns focus respectively on results yielded by the 
regressions on panel data grouped by destination country, by source country and by the 
combination of destination country and source country. Since panel data regression is 
literally equivalent to introducing fixed effect of the group variable into pooled regression, it 
is not surprising that, in model 2, where the fixed effect of destination country is already 
controlled for, some of the explanatory variables that are related to destination country, for 
example, unemployment rate in destination country,  stand insignificant, whereas in model 3, 
where the fixed effect of source country is controlled for instead, most of the explanatory 
variables that are related to source country turn insignificant. The reason for this is that, take 
model 3 as an example, the fixed effect of source country might have already captured part 
of the mechanism between migration flow and the explanatory variables that are related to 
source country.  
 
While controlling for the fixed effects of the respective group variables, those three panel 
data regressions also insinuate certain interpretations of interest. The results from model 3 
which controls for the fixed effect of source country tend to reflect the mechanism that 
determines the direction of migration flow at the macro level and the destination choice of 
migrants at the micro level. By contrast, the results from model 2 that controls for the fixed 
effect of destination country instead reveal to a certain extent the source composition of  
migration flow. Model 4, based on the regression with the fixed effect of destination country 
and source country in addition controlled for, discusses specific migration flows and hence 
focuses more on the effects of different explanatory variables on the intensity of migration 
 
6
 To avoid multicollinearity, here we introduce 14 year dummies with the year 1992 as the reference year. 
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flow
7
. In the following section, when discussing specific independent variables, we will refer 
back to these interesting interpretations.  
 
Not only do conventional economic variables stand significant in our context, their effects 
also have expected signs
8
. GDP per capita in source country imposes a negative effect on 
migration flow, both in general terms and in terms of the source composition of migrants in 
destination country. Given other variables unchanged, a 1% increase in GDP per capita in 
source country will lead to approximately a 0.3% decrease in the rate of migration flow in 
general. With other variables unchanged, given a specific destination country, a 1% increase 
in GDP per capita in source country will result in approximately a 0.4% decrease in the rate 
of migration flow into that destination country. This tends to imply that, the better economic 
well-being a source country boasts, the fewer of its residents would bother to flow out, and 
hence that each destination country has more migrants from source countries with lower 
income level. The coefficient on GDP per capita in destination country stands positive both 
in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of destination country and that controlled for 
the fixed effect of both destination country and source country. With other factors unchanged, 
given a specific destination country, a 1% increase in its GDP per capita will bring about a 
5% increase in the rate of migration flow from all source countries in general and 
approximately a 8% increase in the rate of each source-specific migration flow into that 
destination country. This indicates that the attracting power of each destination country, with 
respect to the whole source group in general or to specific members of that group, grows 
with its GDP per capita. Yet, interestingly, the insignificant coefficient in the regression 
controlled for the fixed effect of source country seems to show that GDP per capita might 
have no impact on the destination choice of migrants. This tends to insinuate that would-be 
migrants may not employ GDP per capita in destination country as a criterion when choosing 
where to move, yet they will migrate more if GDP per capita in those places that they choose 
as destination increases. As to the effect of employment opportunities, unemployment rate in 
source country affects migration flow positively, both in general terms and in terms of the 
source composition of migrants in destination country and the intensity of specific migration 
flow as well. The higher the unemployment rate in a source country becomes, the more 
 
7
 By “specific”, we emphasize the source and the destination of the migration flow. For example, each 
destination country will have 12 “specific” migration flows, from 12 source countries respectively, and vice 
versa. 
8
 By conventional economic variables, we refer to income, i.e. GDP per capita, and the probability of 
employment opportunity, i.e. unemployment rate.  
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would-be migrants would be “pushed” out. Destination countries boast more migrants from 
source countries with higher unemployment rate, with a 1% increase in unemployment rate 
associated with a 0.3% increase in the rate of migration flow, and even more if the 
unemployment rate in those countries rises, with a 1% increase equivalent to another 0.3% 
increase in the rate of the specific migration flow. In the same vein, unemployment rate in 
destination country imposes a negative impact on migration flow. With other variables 
unchanged, a 1% increase in unemployment rate in destination country will lead to a 0.5% 
decrease in the rate of migration flow in general. Would-be migrants tend to choose those 
places with lower unemployment rate, with a 1% decrease in unemployment rate in 
destination country associated with a 0.5% increase in the rate of migration flow.  
 
The coefficient on social expenditure stands negative both in the pooled regression and in the 
regression using source country fixed effect. With other variables unchanged, a 1% increase 
in the percentage that total expenditure on social protection takes up in GDP in destination 
country will result in approximately a 1.4% decrease in the rate of migration flow in general. 
With other variables unchanged, given a specific source country, a 1% increase in the 
percentage that total expenditure on social protection takes up in GDP in destination country 
will lead to approximately a 1.3% decrease in the rate of migration flow of that source 
country. Therefore, interestingly, welfare benefits are inconducive to migration flow and 
people move to places with lower welfare benefits.   
 
Confirming the consensus regarding the effect of migration network, the coefficient on stock 
of migrants is positive throughout. With other variables unchanged, a 1% increase in the 
source-specific stock of migrants will bring about a 0.8% increase in the rate of migration 
flow in general, and in the case of a specific destination country, this results in a 0.7% 
increase in the rate of migration flow into that destination country, while in the case of a 
specific source country, this contributes to a 0.8% increase in the rate of migration flow of 
that source country. This implies that stock of migrants is generally favorable to migration. 
For a destination country, which source country it attracts migrants from and how large is the 
attracted group depend on the composition of its existing stock of migrants. As to the 
destination choice of individuals, migrants prefer places with higher stock of their folk 
people and tend to migrate more if the relevant stock in those places increases.       
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Table 5-2: Regressions results from models with year dummies for 1992-2006 
Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
The rate of migration flow 
pooled OLS 
fixed effect,  fixed effect,  fixed effect,  
(logarithm) destination  source  both 
GDP per capita source -0.277*** -0.306*** 0.107 -0.381 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0918) (0.0829) (0.484) (0.536) 
GDP per capita destination -0.0289 5.231** 0.0588 7.588*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.734) (2.033) (0.715) (1.949) 
Unemployment rate source 0.223*** 0.277*** 0.112 0.327** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0775) (0.0707) (0.178) (0.139) 
Unemployment rate destination -0.449*** 0.132 -0.442*** 0.2 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.149) (0.224) (0.146) (0.218) 
Social protection expenditure,% of GDP -1.345*** -0.908 -1.243*** 0.805 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.43) (1.237) (0.411) (0.932) 
Stock of foreign population  0.784*** 0.661*** 0.788*** 0.557** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0392) (0.041) (0.0497) (0.228) 
Labor force source -0.738*** -0.691*** 0.208 -0.425 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0464) (0.0445) (1.043) (0.738) 
Labor force destination 0.482*** 1.41 0.485*** 3.126* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0607) (2.332) (0.0681) (1.892) 
GDP growth rate source -0.0332 -0.0477 -0.0309 -0.00319 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0742) (0.0702) (0.0732) (0.0494) 
GDP growth rate destination 0.0533 0.013 0.0662 0.0236 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0544) (0.0542) (0.0531) (0.0447) 
Per capita GDP growth rate source 0.00511*** 0.00599*** -0.000565 -0.00148 
(squared, lagged) (0.00175) (0.00162) (0.00208) (0.00139) 
Per capita GDP growth rate destination -0.00288 0.00822 -0.00254 0.00931* 
(squared, lagged) (0.008) (0.00773) (0.0079) (0.0054) 
Distance -0.248*** -0.324*** -0.324***   
 (logarithm) (0.0658) (0.0594) (0.0864)   
Common border 0.0907 -0.0215 -0.00352   
(dummy) (0.132) (0.129) (0.134)   
Similarity of languages 0.034 0.204*** 0.0148   
  (0.0568) (0.0496) (0.0562)   
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
_cons -0.91 -63.96* -12.74 -110.1*** 
  (8.677) (38.19) (10.33) (29.41) 
F-statistics testing coefficients  3.03 2.66 2.53 3.36 
on year dummies (p-value) (0.002) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0001) 
N 614 614 614 614 
adj. R-sq 0.868 0.758 0.873 0.514 
Note: 1, Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. 2, Individual coefficients are statistically 
significant at the *10% level, **5% level or ***1% level (two-side test). 3, The F-statistics test the joint 
hypothesis that coefficients on year dummies are all zero. P-values are given in parentheses under F-statistics.  
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The effect of distance is statistically significant throughout and, as is expected, stands 
negative, while that on the dummy variable regarding the existence of common border is 
insignificant throughout. This indicates that it is mainly the geographic distance that matters, 
in the general migration flow, in the source composition of migrants in destination country, 
and in the destination choice of migrants. Would-be migrants do prefer places that are not so 
far way and hence in the realized rate of migration flow, for each destination country, there 
is a bigger cluster of migrants from source countries in a shorter distance, while whether 
there exists any common border is not so relevant. The coefficient on similarity of languages 
is only statistically significant in the regression using destination country fixed effect. This 
tends to imply that destination countries may have more migrants from countries with which 
they share similar languages. Combing the coefficients on those three variables, we can 
claim that as is unanimously-agreed, costs and risks have a negative impact on migration 
flow and that their effect thereon is generally better captured by the variable of distance.  
 
The coefficient on labor force in source country is negative in the pooled regression and in 
the regression using destination country fixed effect. With other factors unchanged, a 1% 
increase in labor force in source country will lead to approximately a 0.7% decrease either in 
the rate of migration flow in general or in the rate of migration flow in the case of specific 
destination country. This means that, generally the larger a source country is, the fewer of its 
residents would choose to flow out, and that the source composition of migrants in each 
destination country is thereby relatively skewed to smaller source countries. This finding 
tends to coincide with that of Van Wissen and Visser (1998), who point out there exists a 
negative relationship between emigration rate and the size of the region, due to the fact that 
the probability of finding a destination within the same region increases with the size. By 
contrast, except in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of destination country, where 
variables related to destination country turn more often insignificant, the coefficient on labor 
force in destination country is positive throughout. Given other variables unchanged, a 1% 
increase in the labor force in destination country will lead to approximately a 0.5% increase 
either in the rate of migration flow in general or in the rate of migration flow in the case of 
specific source country. This tends to indicate that migrants flow into bigger destination 
countries and hence in general larger destination countries boast higher rate of migration 
flow. Combining this coefficient with that on labor force in source country, we can at least 
claim that there exists a “scale” effect in attracting migration from the side of destination 
country and an “anti-scale” effect in pushing out people from the side of source country. In 
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light of the discussion regarding the implication of the variable of labor force in the 
beginning of this chapter, we may argue that these two effects, though opposite in direction, 
both stem from individuals‟ consideration over the size of employment opportunity. The 
bigger employment opportunity they deem in their own countries, the less they are prone to 
flow out. On the contrary, the bigger employment opportunity they perceive in those 
destination countries, the more they are inclined to migrate. Therefore, referring back to the 
pair of coefficients on unemployment rate in destination country and in source country, 
which also stand in opposite direction, we posit that during migration decision, apart from 
the probability of employment opportunity, would-be migrants consider the size of 
employment opportunity as well.  
 
The effect of the GDP growth rate is statistically insignificant in general, while the effect of 
the square of GDP per capita growth rate in source country stands statistically significant in 
the pooled regression and in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of destination 
country, though mathematically very small. This tends to imply that would-be migrants do 
consider “option of waiting” in migration decision, though the weight that they attach to it 
might be small.  
 
All in all, we conclude from the regression results of the specifications with year dummies 
that: 1) economic incentive plays a relative decisive role in migration flow in our context.  
During the migration decision, would-be migrants consider income or wages together with 
the probability of and the size of employment opportunity. Lower expected income or wages, 
either due to lower income or wages or higher unemployment rate, and fewer employment 
opportunities in their home countries tend to push them out, while higher expected income or 
wages, i.e. higher income or wages or lower unemployment rate, and bigger size of 
employment opportunity in destination country are pulling them away. Furthermore, when 
choosing places to migrate, it seems that agents consider more about employment 
opportunity, either the probability or the size, than the income or wages, and quite obviously, 
they flow into those countries with better employment opportunity. 2) Surprisingly, welfare 
benefits in destination country, measured by the total social protection expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, affect migration flow negatively. Would-be migrants move to places 
with lower welfare benefits. 3) Stock of migrants is conducive to migration flow. Migrants 
tend to flow into places with higher stock of their folk people and migrate more if the 
relevant stock in those places increases. 4) Costs and risks rendered by distance and 
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language affect migration flow negatively. 5) Option of waiting does have its certain place in 
migration flow, yet its effect is small.  
5.2 Effect of change in migration regime 
 
In 2004, the 12 transition countries, except Bulgaria and Romania which became new EU 
member states until 2007, were acceded into EU. We wonder whether this big change, which 
alleviated understandably many barriers in migration and facilitated free flow of labor in a 
more literal sense, exerts any impact on migration flow. Examining the evolution of the rate 
of migration flow in general during 1992-2006 illustrated in Figure 4-5, we believe that the 
year 2004, 2005 and 2006 should belong to the same club. Therefore, we introduce into our 
regression a variable called BREAK which for all source countries except Bulgaria and 
Romania takes the value of 0 before 2004 and the value of 1 for the year 2004, 2005 and 
2006 and for Bulgaria and Romania takes the value of 0 throughout, to look into the effect of 
the accession on migration flow in a more formal approach.  
 
The four specifications in this category are based on the following regression equation: 
ln(M/Psdt) =  φ1ln(GDPpct-1d )  + φ2ln(GDPpct-1s) + φ3ln(ut-1d) + φ4ln(ut-1s) + φ5ln(SEt-1d) 
+φ6ln(Stockt-1sd) + φ7ln(LFt-1d) + φ8ln(LFt-1s) + φ9ln(distsd) + φ10lansd + φ11combousd + φ12 
ln(GDPgrt-1d) + φ13ln(GDPgrt-1s) + φ14(GDPpcgrt-1d)
2
 + φ15(GDPpcgrt-1s)
2
 + φ16BREAK + 
φ17BREAK * ln(GDPpct-1d )  + φ18BREAK * ln(GDPpct-1s) + φ19BREAK * ln(ut-1d) + 
φ20BREAK * ln(ut-1s) + φ21BREAK * ln(SEt-1d) +φ22BREAK * ln(Stockt-1sd) + φ23BREAK * 
ln(LFt-1d) + φ24BREAK * ln(LFt-1s) + φ25BREAK * ln(GDPgrt-1d) + φ26BREAK * ln(GDPgrt-
1s) + φ27BREAK * (GDPpcgrt-1d)
2
 + φ28BREAK * (GDPpcgrt-1s)
2
 + Эt                                (21) 
where interactions between BREAK and the other explanatory variables are included in 
addition and Э is the error term. 
 
The results are reported in Table 5-3. The coefficient on the variable BREAK is negative in 
both pooled regression and in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of source country. 
This indicates that the advent of accession decreases migration flow in general and the 
migration outflow from each specific source country.  
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Table 5-3: Regression results from models with break and break 
interactions during 1992-2006 
Dependent variable: Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
The rate of migration flow 
pooled OLS 
fixed effect,  fixed effect,  fixed effect,  
(logarithm) destination  source  both 
GDP per capita source -0.232** -0.308*** -0.466 -1.648** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0996) (0.0923) (0.324) (0.677) 
GDP per capita destination 0.512 1.959*** 0.067 3.263*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.542) (0.428) (0.676) (0.971) 
Unemployment rate source 0.127 0.206** -0.158 -0.0314 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.101) (0.0893) (0.19) (0.15) 
Unemployment rate destination -0.412*** 0.0274 -0.502*** -0.306* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.149) (0.16) (0.153) (0.158) 
Social protection expenditure,% of GDP -1.626*** -1.670** -1.653*** -0.322 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.488) (0.84) (0.42) (0.581) 
Stock of foreign population  0.848*** 0.692*** 0.807*** 0.586** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0461) (0.0506) (0.0531) (0.229) 
Labor force source -0.799*** -0.744*** -2.993*** -1.669* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0611) (0.059) (1.034) (0.865) 
Labor force destination 0.407*** 0.84 0.457*** -0.265 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0694) (2.24) (0.0698) (2) 
GDP growth rate source -0.163 -0.167 -0.163 -0.101 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.121) (0.101) (0.114) (0.0724) 
GDP growth rate destination 0.0831* 0.0101 0.0757 0.0154 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0479) (0.0496) (0.0469) (0.0461) 
Per capita GDP growth rate source 0.00745*** 0.00739*** -0.0002 -0.000299 
(squared, lagged) (0.00288) (0.00242) (0.00257) (0.0017) 
Per capita GDP growth rate destination -0.0000868 0.00959 0.00191 0.00586 
(squared, lagged) (0.00713) (0.00664) (0.00684) (0.0048) 
Distance -0.133 -0.271*** -0.361***   
 (logarithm) (0.085) (0.0736) (0.102)   
Common border 0.25 0.0538 0.0603   
(dummy) (0.186) (0.176) (0.164)   
Similarity of languages 0.0468 0.179*** 0.00303   
  (0.0779) (0.0667) (0.0749)   
BREAK -23.13** 6.337 -35.32*** -18.31* 
(dummy) (11.48) (12.01) (12.42) (11) 
Break interactions 
   
  
*GDP per capita source -1.347*** -1.717*** -0.668 -0.476 
  (0.431) (0.451) (0.508) (0.397) 
*GDP per capita destination 2.326** 0.617 2.753** 1.981** 
  (1.058) (1.057) (1.096) (0.903) 
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*unemployment rate source -0.0612 -0.306* 0.189 0.219 
  (0.188) (0.183) (0.229) (0.189) 
*unemployment rate destination 0.502** 0.0188 0.670*** -0.108 
  (0.238) (0.248) (0.228) (0.261) 
 *social protection expenditure,% of GDP 2.305*** 0.554 2.446*** 0.602 
  (0.824) (0.893) (0.766) (0.818) 
*stock of foreign population  -0.221*** -0.106 -0.169** 0.0405 
  (0.0769) (0.0765) (0.0793) (0.036) 
*labor force source 0.156* 0.145 0.155* 0.0588 
  (0.0923) (0.0898) (0.092) (0.0491) 
*labor force destination 0.351*** 0.173 0.291** -0.0067 
  (0.127) (0.137) (0.13) (0.109) 
*GDP growth rate source 0.246 0.224 0.196 0.0746 
  (0.157) (0.144) (0.157) (0.107) 
*GDP growth rate destination -0.237** 0.0323 -0.226* 0.00231 
  (0.119) (0.131) (0.121) (0.136) 
*per capita GDP growth rate source -0.00564 -0.00642* -0.00248 -0.00227 
  (0.00363) (0.00345) (0.00319) (0.00268) 
*per capita GDP growth rate destination 0.00865 0.00706 0.00293 0.00611 
  (0.019) (0.01949 (0.019) (0.0172) 
*distance -0.168 -0.00778 0.102   
  (0.136) (0.13) (0.138)   
*common border 0.262 0.225 0.537**   
  (0.262) (0.245) (0.239)   
*similarity of languages 0.0596 0.113 0.112   
  (0.0924) (0.0916) (0.0883)   
_cons -4.613 -23.43 21.18 -10.68 
  (6.82) (18.36) (13.13) (19.55) 
N 614 614 614 614 
adj. R-sq 0.868 0.758 0.881 0.554 
 
Note: 1, Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. 2, Individual coefficients are statistically 
significant at the *10% level, **5% level or ***1% level (two-side test). 3, In the group of break interactions, 
*GDP per capita source denotes the interaction term between BREAK and GDP per capita in source country, 
and so forth.  
 
Assigning 1992-2003 and 2004-2006 to be the first and the second period respectively, we 
can conclude from the coefficients on those interaction terms that the mechanism that 
determines migration flow does not follow exactly the same pattern across periods. Variables 
that exert similar effects on migration flow throughout the two periods are unemployment 
rate in source country, labor force in source country, distance, similarity of languages, as 
well as GDP growth rate and per capita GDP growth rate both in destination country and in 
source country.  
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Unemployment rate in source country continues to affect migration flow positively, though 
its effect is significant in fewer specifications compared to what is in the previous model 
with year dummies, and with a smaller magnitude. With other factors unchanged, given a 
specific destination country, a 1% increase in unemployment rate in source country will 
bring about a 0.2% increase in the rate of migration flow for that destination country. Hence, 
in terms of the rate of migration flow, the source composition of migrants in destination 
country is still skewed to source countries with higher unemployment rate, and remains so 
across periods. The coefficient on labor force in source country in the present context is 
negative throughout the four specifications. Destination countries still attract more migrants 
from countries with smaller labor force, with a 1% decrease in labor force in source country 
associated with a 0.8% increase in the rate of migration flow for specific destination 
countries, and tend to attract more if the labor force in those countries decreases, with a 1% 
decrease leading to a 1.7% increase in the rate of specific migration flow. Therefore, to 
conclude, throughout the two periods, employment opportunity in source country, either the 
probability or the size, affects migration flow negatively.  
 
As is in the previous model with year dummies, the coefficient on similarity of languages is 
positive, while that on distance stands negative. This indicates, costs and risks continue to 
affect migration flow negatively, which doesn‟t differ across periods either. As to the other 
four variables, throughout the two periods, the effect of GDP growth rate, either in 
destination country or in source country, and that of GDP per capita growth rate in 
destination country still stand insignificant, while the existence of the effect of the option of 
waiting, captured by GDP per capita growth rate in source country, is still supported, though 
mathematically small.  
  
The existence of behavior disparity across periods lies in the effects of income or wages, 
either in destination country or in source country, employment opportunity in destination 
country, either the probability or the size, the percentage that total expenditure on social 
protection takes up in GDP in destination country, the stock of source-specific migrants in 
destination country, and the dummy variable concerning the existence of common border in 
addition. The signs of the coefficients on GDP per capita in source country and on labor 
force in destination country are quite similar across periods, yet they seem to exert bigger 
impacts in absolute terms in the second period. For instance, labor force in destination 
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country still affects destination choice of migrants positively. Yet, with other variables 
unchanged, given a specific source country, a 1% increase in labor force in destination 
country leads to a 0.5% increase in the rate of migration flow from that source country in the 
first period, while that in the second period is associated with a 0.7% increase instead. GDP 
per capita in source country also imposes a bigger influence in the second period on the rate 
of migration flow in general and the source composition of migrants in destination country 
as well, with a 1% increase in GDP per capita in source country associated with a 1.6% 
decrease and a 2% decrease respectively, as is compared with the decreases of 0.2% and 
0.3% respectively in the first period. However, its effect on the intensity of migration flow 
doesn‟t differ across period, either in terms of sign or in terms of magnitude. This pattern of 
similar sign but a bigger magnitude of effect in the second period also finds in the effect of 
GDP per capita in destination country. Yet, it is worth noticing that in the second period, 
GDP per capita in destination country begins to matter in the destination choice of migrants. 
With other factors unchanged, given a specific source country, a 1% increase in GDP per 
capita in destination country will bring about a 2.8% increase in the rate of migration flow 
from that source country. Hence, after the accession, individuals start to manifest preference 
over destination countries with better income or wages during migration decision.  
 
The biggest disparity across periods in the set of economic variables stands in the case of 
unemployment rate in destination country. In the first period, the coefficient on 
unemployment rate in destination country is negative in the pooled regression and in the 
regression controlled for the fixed effect of source country, while that in the second period 
turns out to be positive instead though mathematically small, 0.09 and 0.068 respectively. 
Therefore, interestingly, in the first period, agents dislike high unemployment rate in 
destination country and hence choose to migrate into countries with lower unemployment 
rate, while, in the second period, it is shown that high unemployment rate stands no longer 
despicable and that migrants move to places with higher unemployment rate and thus with a 
bigger shortage of jobs instead. These two contradicting behavior patterns of migrants with 
regard to unemployment rate in destination country can find their respective support from 
empirical findings in the literature, though the former (Eriksson, 1989; Faini and Venturini, 
1994; Hartog and Vriend, 1989; Lundborg, 1991a; Poot, 1995) more overwhelming than the 
latter (Katseli and Glytsos, 1989). Yet, we find it hard to explain why agents‟ preference 
shifts across periods.   
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The effect of welfare benefits in destination, represented by the total social protection 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, manifests the biggest disparity across periods.  
In the first period, while standing insignificant in the last specification controlled for the 
fixed effect of both destination country and source country, the coefficient on the total social 
protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in destination country is negative in the 
pooled regression, in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of destination country and 
that controlled for the fixed effect of source country. This implies that in the first period, 
welfare benefits are inconducive to migration flow in general, that would-be migrants flow 
to places with lower welfare benefits, that each destination country attracts more migrants 
from the group of source countries in general if its welfare benefits as is measured by the 
total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreases, and yet whether they 
will attract more from each source country is ambiguous. Take the destination choice of 
migrants for instance, with other variables unchanged, given a specific source country, a 1% 
decrease in the total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in destination 
country will bring about a 1.6% increase in the rate of migration flow from that source 
country. By contrast, in the second period, the effect of this very variable turns positive in 
the pooled regression and in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of source country, 
while remaining the same as in the first period in the other two specifications. This 
insinuates that in the second period, welfare benefits offered in destination country instigates 
migration flow, that migrants now tend to choose places with higher welfare benefits instead, 
yet that contradictorily they are prone to migrate more if welfare benefits in those places 
decreases, and that the effect of welfare benefits on the intensity of specific migration flow is 
still inconclusive. Take again the destination choice of migrants as a example, in the second 
period, with other factors unchanged, given a specific source country, a 1% increase in the 
total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in destination country will lead to 
a 0.8% increase in the rate of migration flow from that source country.  
 
Stock of migrants in destination country affects migration flow positively across periods. It 
encourages migration flow in general and promotes the intensity of specific migration flow. 
Migrants move to places that boast higher stock of their “folk people” and tend to migrate 
more if this relevant stock grows. However, it seems that in the second period, the effect of 
the stock of migrants on the migration flow in general and on the destination choice of 
migrants is reduced. For instance, with other factors unchanged, given a specific source 
country, a 1% increase in the stock of migrants in destination country will lead to a 0.8% 
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increase in the rate of migration flow from that source country in the first period, while that 
is associated with a 0.6% increase instead in the second period. Reasons for the smaller 
impact in the second period can be various. For instance, the fewer barriers in the second 
period might induce would-be migrants to be less dependent on the existence of their folk 
people in funneling information, in providing necessary support and in reducing certain risks. 
The consequently smaller weight that they attach to the stock of their folk people might lead 
to the smaller effect of this variable in the second period captured in our regression.  
 
Period also seems to matter in the effect of the dummy variable checking the existence of 
common border. As is in the previous model with year dummies, the coefficient on this 
variable in the first period is insignificant throughout. However, in the second period, the 
existence of common border begins to affect the destination choice of migrants. In other 
words, in addition to places in the shorter distance, migrants in the second period also prefer 
those that share a common border with their home country.  
  
In short, we conclude: 1) the accession and hence the change in migration regime do exert a 
substantial impact on migration flow. It not only affects the level of migration flow, but also 
changes the pattern of the mechanism of migration. This result is consistent with the finding 
of Bruecker et al. (2002). 2) Economic variables seize a relative decisive place in the context 
of east-west internal European migration. Generally speaking, they tend to exert a bigger 
impact in the second period. GDP per capita in destination country in particular, begins to 
matter in the destination choice of migrants. 3) Interestingly, the effect of welfare benefits 
offered in destination country, as is measured by the total social protection expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP differs widely across period. Their impact on migration flow in the first 
period is generally negative, as is in the previous model with year dummies, while in the 
second period, it turns to be positive in the case of migration flow in general and in the 
context of destination choice of migrants.  Hence, in terms of the destination of migration 
flow, while people in the first period head for places with lower welfare benefits, they follow 
an opposite direction in the second period. 4) Stock of source-specific migrants in 
destination country affects migration flow positively, while costs and risks rendered by 
distance and language affects negatively, the former of which manifests a small disparity 
across periods in that the magnitude of the effect in the second period is smaller, while the 
latter doesn‟t follow suit generally. 5) A close comparison between behavior patterns across 
periods will yield a suspicion that individuals‟ rational incentive begins to have a bigger play 
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in the second period. For instance, as is mentioned earlier in this paragraph, the impact of 
economic variables increases in the second period. Furthermore, in terms of destination 
choice, the realized migration begins to respond to GDP per capita in destination country and 
to respond in a more reasonable manner to welfare benefits in destination country in the 
second period. Therefore, we tentatively argue that after the change in migration regime, the 
mechanism that determines migration flow is more genuinely revealed and that it‟s the 
existence of the barriers forged by policies before the accession that probably constituted 
bondages for would-be migrant and thereby restrained the realized migration flow from 
reflecting the true rationale of agents‟ migration decision in the first period.  
5.3 Two different measures: welfare generosity index versus 
total social protection expenditure  
 
In those previous regressions, we employ the percentage that total expenditure on social 
protection takes up in GDP as the measure for welfare benefits. However, this standard 
approach doesn‟t win a unanimous applause. Some scholars argue that social protection 
expenditure data may not constitute a good indicator for welfare benefit level. They point out 
in particular that the time serie data of social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
do not necessarily correspond to the trend of welfare benefits closely. One major problem is 
that a negative shock to economy may render a rise in the total expenditure on social 
protection, which does not necessarily indicate an improvement of the benefit level in the 
design of welfare system. Examining Figure 4-1, which juxtaposes total expenditure on 
social protection as a percentage of GDP against another measure of welfare benefits, the 
welfare generosity index developed by Lyle Scruggs, this accusation doesn‟t seem to be 
ungrounded. Total expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP does show 
certain spikes during the time period of our discussion. Hence, to be on a safer ground, we 
run two sets of regressions using respectively the new measure, welfare generosity index, 
and the previous measure, social protection expenditure, as the indicator for welfare benefits. 
Note that due to the unavailability of welfare generosity index for Greece, Portugal and 
Spain and for the period of 2004-2006, the regressions down below are for those 12 
destination countries during the period 1992-2003. The regression equation is as follows: 
ln(M/Psdt) =  φ1ln(GDPpct-1d )  + φ2ln(GDPpct-1s) + φ3ln(ut-1d) + φ4ln(ut-1s) + φ5ln(WBt-1d) 
+φ6ln(Stockt-1sd) + φ7ln(LFt-1d) + φ8ln(LFt-1s) + φ9ln(distsd) + φ10lansd + φ11combousd + φ12 
ln(GDPgrt-1d) + φ13ln(GDPgrt-1s) + φ14(GDPpcgrt-1d)
2
 + φ15(GDPpcgrt-1s)
2
 + ∑φtYDt + єt   (22)                    
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where WB denotes welfare benefits and corresponds to welfare generosity index and total 
social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP respectively. YDt is the year dummy to 
control for the fixed year effect for the period 1992-2003 and є the error term9. 
 
The results are reported in Table 5-4 and Table 5-5. From those two tables, denoting the set 
of regressions using welfare generosity index as case one and the one using social protection 
expenditure as case two, we can see that the coefficients on the variables other than welfare 
benefits are in general quite similar between the two cases, both in terms of sign and of 
significance level, though the magnitudes of the effects might differ slightly. This seems to 
imply that which measure we take to represent welfare benefits does not much affect or 
undermine our model in capturing the effects of other variables on migration flow. Hence, it 
justifies the use of total social protection expenditure in terms of GDP as the indicator for 
welfare benefits in our regression models in section 5.1 and 5.2 for the period 1992-2006, for 
which the welfare generosity index is not available throughout.  
 
A close look at the regression results regarding welfare benefits yields that the choice of 
measure does make a difference. Except in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of 
source country, where the coefficient on the very variable stands positive, the impact of the 
total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP is yielded to be generally 
insignificant. Yet the case with regard to welfare generosity index is utterly the reverse, with 
the coefficient in the regression controlled for the fixed effect of source country insignificant 
and those in the rest three specifications positive. This implies that when employing welfare 
generosity index as the measure for welfare benefits, welfare benefits appear to elicit 
migration flow and that the attracting power of destination countries, either to the whole 
source group as a whole or to the specific members of the group, grows with its welfare 
benefit level. For instance, with other factors unchanged, given a specific destination country, 
a 1% increase in welfare generosity index will lead to a 2.1% increase in the rate of 
migration flow into that destination country. And with other factors unchanged, as far as a 
specific migration flow is concerned, a 1% increase in welfare generosity index will bring 
about a 2.2% increase in the rate of the specific migration flow. 
 
 
9
 Here, we introduce 11 year dummies keeping again the year 1992 as the reference category. 
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Table 5-4: Regression results from models using welfare generosity index 
and year dummies for 1992-2003 
Dependent variable: Model 9 Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
The rate of migration flow 
pooled OLS 
fixed effect,  fixed effect,  fixed effect,  
(logarithm) destination  source  both 
GDP per capita source -0.155* -0.241*** -0.151 -0.113 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0914) (0.078) (0.546) (0.3629 
GDP per capita destination 2.473*** 7.179*** 2.687*** 5.706*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.682) (2.557) (0.649) (1.736) 
Unemployment rate source 0.166* 0.225*** -0.153 0.0645 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0849) (0.0729) (0.189) (0.137) 
Unemployment rate destination -0.1 0.358 -0.0614 0.00669 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.135) (0.235) (0.125 (0.153 
Welfare generosity index 0.413* 2.115** 0.318 2.256*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.243) (0.91) (0.206) (0.635) 
Stock of foreign population  0.699*** 0.536*** 0.725*** 0.264** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0381) (0.0364) (0.0539) (0.104) 
Labor force source -0.690*** -0.612*** -3.062** -3.027*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0537) (0.0496) (1.273) (0.75) 
Labor force destination 0.643*** -4.267 0.602*** -4.265** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0656) (2.721) (0.0748) (2) 
GDP growth rate source -0.233** -0.242*** -0.159 -0.0877 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.109) (0.0896) (0.106) (0.0564) 
GDP growth rate destination -0.0152 -0.0736 -0.00956 -0.0542 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0619) (0.0603) (0.0564) (0.042) 
Per capita GDP growth rate source 0.00950*** 0.0105*** 0.0015 0.000386 
(squared, lagged) (0.00275) (0.00217) (0.00249) (0.0012) 
Per capita GDP growth rate destination -0.00275 0.00123 -0.00217 0.00239 
(squared, lagged) (0.00814) (0.00714) (0.0077) (0.00429) 
Distance -0.402*** -0.425*** -0.488***   
 (logarithm) (0.0802) (0.0659) (0.108)   
Common border 0.217 -0.0246 -0.0007   
(dummy) (0.161) (0.264) (0.156)   
Similarity of languages -0.0134 0.227*** -0.0305   
  (0.0804) (0.0563) (0.0784)   
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
_cons -34.87*** -45.18* -15.69 -11.67 
  (7.279) (26.11) (12.42) (18.53) 
F-statistics testing coefficients  1.71 1.68 2.47 1.05 
on year dummies (p-value) (0.0763) (0.0836) (0.0078) (0.4046) 
N 381 381 381 381 
adj. R-sq 0.885 0.762 0.902 0.468 
Note: 1, Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. 2, Individual coefficients are statistically 
significant at the *10% level, **5% level or ***1% level (two-side test). 3, The F-statistics test the joint 
hypothesis that coefficients on year dummies are all zero. P-values are given in parentheses under F-statistics.  
49 
  
Table 5-5: Regression results from models using total expenditure on social 
protection as a percentage of GDP and year dummies for 1992-2003 
Dependent variable: Model 13 Model 14  Model 15 Model 16 
The rate of migration flow 
pooled OLS 
fixed effect,  fixed effect,  fixed effect,  
(logarithm) destination  source  both 
GDP per capita source -0.145 -0.236*** -0.184 -0.0779 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0914) (0.0789) (0.544) (0.394) 
GDP per capita destination 3.414*** 2.159 3.764*** 2.335 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.955) (2.689) (0.901) (1.749) 
Unemployment rate source 0.168** 0.225*** -0.117 0.0653 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0832) (0.0738) (0.186) (0.143) 
Unemployment rate destination 0.0268 0.475** 0.0971 0.122 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.171 (0.238 (0.156 (0.153 
Social protection expenditure,% of GDP 0.897 -1.355 1.012** -0.275 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.555) (1.232) (0.512) (0.822) 
Stock of foreign population  0.680*** 0.543*** 0.694*** 0.316*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0396) (0.037) (0.0572) (0.109) 
Labor force source -0.674*** -0.615*** -2.947** -2.899*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0534) (0.0492) (1.266) (0.802) 
Labor force destination 0.655*** -0.369 0.638*** -0.313 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0738) (2.2) (0.0859) (1.394) 
GDP growth rate source -0.228** -0.237** -0.143 -0.0889 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.109) (0.0924) (0.104) (0.0609) 
GDP growth rate destination -0.00729 -0.0241 -0.0102 -0.0103 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0581) (0.0614) (0.0537) (0.0442) 
Per capita GDP growth rate source 0.00953*** 0.0104*** 0.00142 0.00044 
(squared, lagged) (0.00273) (0.00223) (0.00243) (0.00126) 
Per capita GDP growth rate destination -0.00247 0.00462 -0.00186 0.00505 
(squared, lagged) (0.00813) (0.00726) (0.00764) (0.0044) 
Distance -0.416*** -0.422*** -0.526***   
 (logarithm) (0.079) (0.0663) (0.109)   
Common border 0.2 -0.0265 -0.00647   
(dummy) (0.166) (0.264) (0.164)   
Similarity of languages -0.0142 0.229*** -0.027   
  (0.0831) (0.0576) (0.0802)   
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
_cons -46.36*** -18.03 -30.00* -5.732 
  (11.54) (32.2) (15.66) (22.16) 
F-statistics testing coefficients  2.11 1.41 1.48 1.44 
on year dummies (p-value) (0.0234) (0.1725) (0.1451) (0.1628) 
N 381 381 381 381 
adj. R-sq 0.885 0.759 0.902 0.431 
 
Note: 1, Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. 2, Individual coefficients are statistically 
significant at the *10% level, **5% level or ***1% level (two-side test). 3, The F-statistics test the joint 
hypothesis that coefficients on year dummies are all zero. P-values are given in parentheses under F-statistics.  
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Comparing the coefficients on welfare generosity index in case one and those on the total 
social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in case two, we may suspect that the 
insignificance of welfare benefits in those three specifications in case two might be ascribed 
to the alleged flaw of the total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a 
measure for welfare benefits. The possible negative correlation of this measure with the 
macroeconomic environment, instigated by the positive relationship between 
macroeconomic environment and migration flow, may blur the true effect of welfare benefits 
on migration flow. Referring back to the case regarding the behavior pattern in the second 
period in model 5-8, we might get another support for this suspicion. The two positive 
coefficients on welfare benefits represented by the total social protection expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP in model 5 and model 7, indicating that welfare benefits elicit migration 
flow in general and that migrants are attracted to place with higher welfare benefits in the 
second period, contradict the negative coefficient in model 6, which implies that migrants 
tend to migrate less if the welfare benefits in destination places increase. This contradiction 
might find its root in the interaction between the total social protection expenditure and the 
macroeconomic stances which does not necessarily have something to do with welfare 
benefits per ce. It is possible that migrants do deem higher welfare benefits as attractive, and 
that the reason why they migrate less when the total social protection expenditure is higher is 
that they are discouraged by the deteriorated economic situation which most likely gives rise 
to the increase in the total social protection expenditure.  
 
However, considering the fact that the effects of welfare benefits captured by those two 
measures respectively seem to complement each other, we may not stand in the position to 
draw any conclusion regarding which measure is superior. And one reason for this is that 
those two measures both may fall into another pitfall. It is widely admitted that countries that 
are generous in welfare benefits usually are reluctant to have influx of migrants. The thereby 
devised unfavorable policies and practices of migration control which stems from this 
reluctance may dampen the migration flow. Hence, on the one hand, higher welfare benefits 
may elicit migration; on the other hand, higher welfare benefits may often get associated 
with stricter migration control and thus hamper migration at the same time. The fact that 
neither of these two measure can filter the second auxiliary effect through the impact of 
policy and practices away from the first genuine effect of welfare benefits may render that 
drawing any firm conclusion regarding the effect of welfare benefits on migration flow 
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based on the results of regressions employing those two measures as the indicator might 
appear indiscreet.   
 
Notwithstanding, considering that there is yet no widely-agreed better measure of welfare 
benefits, we may combine the coefficients regarding welfare benefits in those two cases 
together and argue that as far as the migration flow from 12 “east” countries into 12 “west” 
countries (which do not include Greece, Portugal and Spain) between 1992-2003 is 
concerned, there is a high possibility that welfare benefits impose a positive impact on 
migration flow. In other words, in our present context, welfare benefits may constitute 
magnets, in that migrants are attracted to places with higher welfare benefits and tend to 
migrate more when welfare benefits in those places grow.  
5.4 The role of outliers 
 
From the case two in section 5.3, we find that migrants are attracted to places with higher 
welfare benefits. Yet in model 3 where the model setting is almost the same and where the 
same measure of welfare benefits is employed, we pin down a reverse result. Even if one 
argues that model 15 is based on the period of 1992-2003 and that the positive effect of 
welfare benefits on the destination choice of migrants might only finds in that period, then 
model 7 with break and break interactions yields that in the first period, which is literally 
1992-2003, welfare benefits affect the destination choice of migrants negatively. Therefore, 
we are obliged to examine whether it is the exclusion of Greece, Portugal and Spain in 
model 15 that creates this puzzle. Hence, we run through the regressions in model 1-4 and 
model 5-8 again on the data set where those three countries are gleaned out and the 
regressions in model 12-16 again with those three countries included.  
 
The results are reported in Table 5-6, Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 respectively. Like the case in 
model 1-4, the coefficients on welfare benefits, as is measured by the total social protection 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, yielded from the pooled regression and from the 
regression controlled for the fixed effect of source country stand statistically significant. Yet, 
now we have positive signs instead. Welfare benefits in destination country elicit migration 
flow, with a 1% increase in the total social protection expenditure in terms of GDP 
associated with a 0.7% increase in the rate of migration flow in general. Would-be migrants 
tend to choose those places with higher welfare benefits. With other factors unchanged, 
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given a specific source country, a 1% increase in the total social protection expenditure in 
terms of GDP in destination will bring about a 0.9% increase in the rate of migration flow 
from that source country. Likewise, the positive coefficient on welfare benefits in model 15 
turns negative in model 27 where we include those three countries. These results to a certain 
extent confirm our suspicion that it‟s those three outliers that blur the interaction between 
welfare benefits and migration flow and distort the regression result. One reason for the trick 
of those three outliers might be that due to certain historical relations or because of the 
relative loose migration control, the latter of which those three outliers have certain 
reputation in, would-be migrants tend to move to these three countries, even though the 
welfare benefits there are not so generous (see Figure 5-1). Hence, while a large part of 
migrants do flow into places with better welfare benefits, another portion of migrants come 
to those three countries with relatively lower welfare benefits. The true mechanism between 
welfare benefits and migration flow is thereby disguised.                        
 
Figure 5-1: Total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Greece, 
 Portugal and Spain versus the rest 12 destination countries, 1990-2005 
 
Source: Compiled from Eurostat. 
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Table 5-6: Regression results from models with year dummies for 1992-2006 
and without Greece, Portugal and Spain 
Dependent variable: Model 17 Model 18  Model 19 Model 20 
The rate of migration flow 
pooled OLS 
fixed effect,  fixed effect,  fixed effect,  
(logarithm) destination  source  both 
GDP per capita source -0.199*** -0.279*** 0.738* 0.334 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0716) (0.0614) (0.396) (0.34) 
GDP per capita destination 2.648*** 4.507*** 2.898*** 5.783*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.656) (1.631) (0.659) (1.381) 
Unemployment rate source 0.272*** 0.316*** 0.239 0.428*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0679 (0.0605) (0.146) (0.109) 
Unemployment rate destination -0.0583 0.232 -0.00641 0.314* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.121) (0.188) (0.119) (0.168) 
Social protection expenditure,% of GDP 0.662* -0.868 0.872** 0.602 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.395) (1.051) (0.392) (0.812) 
Stock of foreign population  0.691*** 0.601*** 0.671*** 0.529*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0321) (0.0312) (0.0436) (0.0996) 
Labor force source -0.678*** -0.651*** -0.285 -0.467 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0409) (0.0391) (0.824) (0.605) 
Labor force destination 0.621*** -0.737 0.651*** 1.106 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.058) (1.606) (0.0678) (1.439) 
GDP growth rate source -0.0273 -0.0288 -0.0175 0.0247 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.07) (0.0659) (0.0705) (0.0458) 
GDP growth rate destination -0.0458 -0.00782 -0.0422 -0.0163 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.049) (0.0517) (0.0468) (0.0411) 
Per capita GDP growth rate source 0.00509*** 0.00543*** -0.000638 -0.00146 
(squared, lagged) (0.00155) (0.00146) (0.00175) (0.00109) 
Per capita GDP growth rate destination -0.00199 0.00555 -0.00221 0.00492 
(squared, lagged) (0.00748) (0.00714) (0.00719) (0.00481) 
Distance -0.402*** -0.408*** -0.510***   
 (logarithm) (0.0586) (0.0531) (0.0806)   
Common border 0.102 -0.0805 0.0529   
(dummy) (0.122) (0.131) (0.126)   
Similarity of languages 0.0302 0.180*** 0.0334   
  (0.052) (0.0437) (0.0516)   
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
_cons -37.52*** -39.1 -51.52*** -80.67*** 
  (7.782) (26.1) (10.03) (23.77) 
F-statistics testing coefficients  2.99 2.02 3.08 2.99 
on year dummies (p-value) (0.0003) (0.0177) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
N 590 590 590 590 
adj. R-sq 0.892 0.788 0.899 0.531 
Note: 1, Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. 2, Individual coefficients are statistically 
significant at the *10% level, **5% level or ***1% level (two-side test). 3, The F-statistics test the joint 
hypothesis that coefficients on year dummies are all zero. P-values are given in parentheses under F-statistics.  
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Table 5-7: Regression results from models with break and break interactions 
during 1992-2006 and without Greece, Portugal and Spain 
 
Dependent variable: Model 21 Model 222  Model 23 Model 24 
The rate of migration flow 
pooled OLS 
fixed effect,  fixed effect,  fixed effect,  
(logarithm) destination  source  both 
GDP per capita source -0.199** -0.256*** -0.919*** -0.543 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0821) (0.071) (0.31) (0.336) 
GDP per capita destination 1.616*** 2.440*** 1.887*** 2.275*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.381) (0.381) (0.609) (0.602) 
Unemployment rate source 0.211** 0.253*** -0.0333 0.127 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0851) (0.0736) (0.156) (0.111) 
Unemployment rate destination -0.222** 0.144 -0.225** -0.0962 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.096) (0.136) (0.112) (0.111) 
Social protection expenditure,% of GDP 0.226 -1.163 0.218 -0.428 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.399) (0.788) (0.401) (0.536) 
Stock of foreign population  0.725*** 0.602*** 0.688*** 0.475*** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0386) (0.0364) (0.0454) (0.0822) 
Labor force source -0.705*** -0.667*** -1.367 -1.251** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0554) (0.0502) (0.905) (0.629) 
Labor force destination 0.573*** -1.997 0.629*** -2.440* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0651) (1.609) (0.0682) (1.391) 
GDP growth rate source -0.0856 -0.13 -0.0714 -0.0351 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.104) (0.0856) (0.1) (0.063) 
GDP growth rate destination 0.0653 -0.0125 0.0444 -0.0372 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0449) (0.0403) 
Per capita GDP growth rate source 0.00517** 0.00650*** -0.000627 -0.000348 
(squared, lagged) (0.00231) (0.00189) (0.00207) (0.00122) 
Per capita GDP growth rate destination -0.00102 0.00293 0.000395 0.0025 
(squared, lagged) (0.00656) (0.00583) (0.00629) (0.00423) 
Distance -0.365*** -0.401*** -0.561***   
 (logarithm) (0.0768) (0.0637) (0.0962)   
Common border 0.091 -0.056 -0.029   
(dummy) (0.16) (0.179) (0.148)   
Similarity of languages -0.00338 0.152** -0.0297   
  (0.0714) (0.0592) (0.0674)   
BREAK -3.218 13.24 -10.78 -11.08 
(dummy) (10.52) (11.82) (11.61) (10.19) 
Break interactions 
   
  
*GDP per capita source -1.381*** -1.676*** -0.830* -0.453 
  (0.428) (0.449) (0.467) (0.362) 
*GDP per capita destination 1.221 0.268 1.272 1.425* 
  (0.986) (1.049) (1.044) (0.864) 
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*unemployment rate source -0.145 -0.329* 0.11 0.263* 
  (0.18) (0.176) (0.215) (0.154) 
*unemployment rate destination 0.311 -0.167 0.444** -0.29 
  (0.209) (0.237) (0.203) (0.247) 
 *social protection expenditure,% of GDP 0.453 -0.0759 0.682 0.21 
  (0.775) (0.863) (0.753) (0.799) 
*stock of foreign population  -0.0984 -0.0169 -0.0637 0.0238 
  (0.0727) (0.0696) (0.0741) (0.0312) 
*labor force source 0.0622 0.0686 0.0816 0.0487 
  (0.0887) (0.0854) (0.0888) (0.0462) 
*labor force destination 0.185 0.0635 0.148 -0.0145 
  (0.125) (0.132) (0.124) (0.105) 
*GDP growth rate source 0.168 0.193 0.111 0.00587 
  (0.144) (0.134) (0.146) (0.0987) 
*GDP growth rate destination -0.219* 0.0455 -0.17 0.0794 
  (0.119) (0.13) (0.117) (0.127) 
*per capita GDP growth rate source -0.00336 -0.00557* 0.00119 -0.00263 
  (0.00321) (0.00313) (0.00292) (0.00231) 
*per capita GDP growth rate destination 0.00959 0.015 0.00237 0.00832 
  (0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0163) 
*distance 0.0636 0.108 0.266**   
  (0.131) (0.125) (0.132)   
*common border 0.421* 0.255 0.632***   
  (0.245) (0.244) (0.221)   
*similarity of languages 0.11 0.117 0.144*   
  (0.0871) (0.086) (0.0823)   
_cons -24.52*** -6.42 -14.44 4.072 
  (5.017) (12.7) (11.99) (14.09) 
N 590 590 590 590 
adj. R-sq 0.892 0.794 0.902 0.591 
 
Note: 1, Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. 2, Individual coefficients are statistically 
significant at the *10% level, **5% level or ***1% level (two-side test). 3, In the group of break interactions, 
*GDP per capita source denotes the interaction term between BREAK and GDP per capita in source country, 
and so forth.  
 
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of those three outliers not only makes a difference 
in the manifested effect of welfare benefit, but also in the manifested impact of GDP per 
capita in destination country. From model 19, the full model with year dummies, model 23, 
the model with break and break interactions, and model 27, the limited model with year 
dummies, we can see that after the exclusion of Greece, Portugal and Spain, GDP per capita 
in destination country begins to matter in the destination choice of migrants. Migrants do 
tend to be attracted to places with better income or wages. And we suspect again that this is 
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due to the fact that those three countries, though with relatively lower income or wages, 
stand attractive to migrants for historical reasons, policy and practices and so forth (see 
Figure 5-2). This thereby generated migration flow coexists with other migration flows that 
follow the more reasonable and rational direction into places with better economic stances 
and may mess up the manifested interaction between migration flow and GDP per capita in 
destination country.  
 
Figure 5-2: GDP per capita, Greece, Portugal and Spain versus the rest 12 
destination countries, 1989-2007 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Eurostat. 
 
In short, if we have to draw a preliminary conclusion regarding the effect of welfare benefits 
on migration flow at this point, we can at least claim there probably exists welfare magnets, 
since after the inclusion of those three countries, which are suspected of stirring up the true 
mechanism, regression results from most of the specifications indicate a positive impact of 
welfare benefits on migration flow. However, considering that the role of welfare benefits in 
migration flow can be so easily disguised or distorted, as in the case where several “not-so-
properly-behaved” countries are included, we are to a certain extent prone to believe the 
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effect of welfare magnets is at least not robust, which we figure is also denoted by the 
insignificant coefficients in model 21-24. In other words, we hold that welfare benefits do 
affect migration flow positively, yet the influence is not robust, so that in some cases it may 
yield to the impact of other more important factors and hence become more obscure.  
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Table 5-8: Regression results from models with year dummies for 1992-
2003 and with Greece, Portugal and Spain 
Dependent variable: Model 25 Model 26  Model 27 Model 28 
The rate of migration flow 
pooled OLS 
fixed effect,  fixed effect,  fixed effect,  
(logarithm) destination  source  both 
GDP per capita source -0.254** -0.282*** -1.159* -1.401* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.101) (0.091) (0.647) (0.753) 
GDP per capita destination -0.0889 0.725 0.135 2.938 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.775) (1.83) (0.74) (1.939) 
Unemployment rate source 0.132 0.190** -0.297 -0.0684 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0988) (0.0894) (0.219) (0.177) 
Unemployment rate destination -0.459*** -0.128 -0.434*** -0.390* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.16 (0.23 (0.152 (0.2 
Social protection expenditure,% of GDP -1.637*** -1.644 -1.587*** 0.436 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.474) (1.25) (0.425) (0.892) 
Stock of foreign population  0.824*** 0.656*** 0.856*** 0.563** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0486) (0.0538) (0.0618) (0.286) 
Labor force source -0.784*** -0.715*** -3.064** -2.842** 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0611) (0.0601) (1.508) (1.151) 
Labor force destination 0.407*** 0.683 0.380*** 0.908 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0726) (2.895) (0.0789) (2.115) 
GDP growth rate source -0.231* -0.244** -0.183 -0.129* 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.12) (0.106) (0.117) (0.0767) 
GDP growth rate destination 0.067 0.0319 0.0836 0.0644 
(logarithm, lagged) (0.0589) (0.0611) (0.0551) (0.0502) 
Per capita GDP growth rate source 0.00795*** 0.00953*** 0.000679 -0.000586 
(squared, lagged) (0.00295) (0.00257) (0.00287) (0.00194) 
Per capita GDP growth rate destination -0.0068 0.00387 -0.00499 0.00503 
(squared, lagged) (0.00856) (0.0078) (0.00832) (0.00464) 
Distance -0.196** -0.302*** -0.271** 
 
(logarithm) (0.087) (0.0774) (0.113) 
 
Common border 0.168 -0.116 -0.0398 
 
(dummy) (0.181) (0.184) (0.166) 
 
Similarity of languages 0.0333 0.201*** -0.00678 
 
  (0.0796) (0.0689) (0.0758) 
 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
_cons 2.322 -9.325 28.40* -12.44 
  (9.347) (38.06) (15.46) (27.74) 
F-statistics testing coefficients  2.33 1.14 0.82 1.61 
on year dummies (p-value) (0.0088) (0.3314) (0.6198) (0.0934) 
N 450 450 450 450 
adj. R-sq 0.857 0.701 0.875 0.454 
Note: 1, Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. 2, Individual coefficients are statistically 
significant at the *10% level, **5% level or ***1% level (two-side test). 3, The F-statistics test the joint 
hypothesis that coefficients on year dummies are all zero. P-values are given in parentheses under F-statistics.  
59 
  
6. Conclusion 
 
Migration is unanimously believed to be triggered by regional difference. This regional 
difference may spread itself over economy (for example, income and employment 
opportunity), welfare benefits, culture, and so forth. Yet the literature of migration research 
concentrates mostly on the regional difference in economy, with the effect of welfare 
benefits on migration failing to draw its due attention. While being relatively more 
frequently discussed in the context of the internal American migration, the role of welfare 
benefits is nearly absent from the mainstream discussion on migration in the context of intra-
European migration.  
 
To confront this black hole, this paper probed into the impact of welfare benefits on the east-
west internal European migration. Based on the existing theoretical discussions, we 
presented a migration model where welfare benefit stands amongst the key factors. 
Combining this with the compiled data from Eurostat, OECD and World Bank WDI, we 
conducted an empirical analysis afterwards on the migration flow from 12 “east” countries to 
15 “west” countries during the period of 1992-2006. Limited by the availability of related 
data, we only examined the effect of the welfare benefits offered in the “west” countries on 
the migration flow in discussion. 
 
We conducted four groups of regressions on the data set. Results from the first group, the 
full models with year dummies, yielded that surprisingly the welfare benefits in destination 
country, as is measured by the total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
affect migration flow negatively. Welfare benefits discourage migration flow in general and 
migrants tend to be attracted to places with lower welfare benefits. This surprising result 
coincided with the outcome regarding the behavior pattern in the first period from the second 
group of regressions that include break and break interactions. Yet, interestingly, it was 
revealed that in the second period welfare benefits represented by the total social protection 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP do have an expected eliciting power in migration flow 
and that migrants now are driven to places with higher welfare benefits instead. Despite this 
one step closer to the commonsense belief regarding the effect of welfare benefits, 
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throughout the two periods, migrants keep migrating less when the welfare benefits 
represented by the total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in those 
destination place increase. 
 
Puzzled by those contradictory and bewildering results from the first two groups of 
regressions, we began to wonder whether we had employed an unsatisfactory measure for 
welfare benefits. Hence, we tried another measure, welfare generosity index, to calibrate for 
welfare benefits, and carried out the third group of regressions comparing those two 
measures on the data set for the period 1992-2003 and with Greece, Portugal and Spain for 
which the welfare generosity index is not available excluded. These regressions pined down 
to a certain extent a positive impact of welfare benefits on migration flow instead. Welfare 
benefits induce migration flow; migrants flow into places with higher welfare benefits and 
migrate more if the welfare benefits in those places grow. As to the issue of measures, we 
found certain evidence for that welfare generosity index is a better measure for welfare 
benefits than the total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in that the latter 
often gets intertwined with economic stances. Yet, we still suspected that welfare generosity 
index can not constitute a very good measure for welfare benefits either, since, together with 
the total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP, it also can not manage to 
filter out the effect of policies and practices that are related to welfare regime design.  
  
To be more prudent, we further looked into whether it‟s the exclusion of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain that gives rise to the more reasonable results in the third group of regressions. 
Hence, we ran the first two groups of regressions again with those three countries excluded 
from the data set, and model 12-16 again with those three countries included. The regression 
results confirmed our suspicion. With the exclusion of Greece, Portugal and Spain, most of 
the specifications pined down a positive effect of welfare benefits in destination country on 
migration flow, even if we still employed the total social protection expenditure in terms of 
GDP as the measure. We thereby argued that welfare benefits in destination country 
probably impose a positive impact on migration flow, yet its influence, judging from the fact 
that it is prone to be disguised or distorted, is not robust.  
 
In short, we can draw the following three conclusions. 1) There exist so-called welfare 
magnets in the context of east-west internal European migration flow. Welfare benefits 
induce migration flow in general. Migrants move to places with higher welfare benefits and 
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might tend to migrate more if the welfare benefits in those destination countries increase. 2) 
Yet, the effect of this welfare magnet is not robust, since its coefficient in our regressions is 
in general quite sensitive to the specification and the choice of countries that we include in 
discussion. 3) Generally speaking, after the change in migration regime, i.e. the accession, 
the role of welfare benefits begins to have a bigger play. The reason for this might be that 
with the lift-up of barriers and hence smaller attention thereto from migrants, the realized 
migration flow starts to reflect the individuals‟ incentive or rational behavior more 
genuinely. Hence, migrants‟ preference regarding welfare benefits in destination country 
comes one step forward in the spotlight. However, we would like to stress that due to the 
unsatisfactoriness regarding the quality of those two measures as the indicator for welfare 
benefits which we discussed in section 5.3 and summed up earlier in this chapter, the 
conclusion that we draw above based on the regressions using those two measures might not 
be able to stand on a very firm ground.  
 
As to the effects of other variables in the context where the impact of welfare benefits is 
considered, we can make the following claims. 1) Economic variables have a relatively big 
role in the context of east-west internal European migration flow. People move to places 
where there find bigger employment opportunity and better expected income, i.e. higher 
income or wages or lower unemployment rate. 2) Migration network prompts migration 
flow. Migrants tend to consider the role of network during migration decision and prefer 
those places with higher stock of their folk people. 3) Costs and risks rendered by distance, 
information and language affect migration flow negatively. 4) Change in migration regime, 
which is more often closely related to the presence or absence of barriers incurred by 
political factors such as policies, influences migration flow both in absolute terms and with 
respect to its behavior pattern. Generally speaking, the lift-up of barriers not only reduces 
migration, but also renders that the realized migration flow reflects the individuals‟ rational 
choice or behavior more genuinely.  
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